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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to 
review, reverse, or annul any order of the 
commission, or to suspend or delay the 
operation or execution of any order. 
§35-1-86 U.C.A. 
II. STATEMENT OF IS8UES 
1. Michael Blackett makes the claim that the Industrial 
Commission committed reversible error when it "•..failed to refer 
the medical aspects of the case back to the medical panel for a 
more detailed analysis or to set the matter for an evidentiary 
hearing where the medical panel members would be subject to cross 
examination." (Appellant's brief at p. 1) The real issue, 
however, is, did Mr. Blackett ...marshal the evidence in support 
of the [Commission's] findings and then demonstrate that those 
findings are unsupported by substantial evidence...? Stewart v. 
Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134 (Utah App. 1992) See also, Merriam 
v. Board of Review, 812 P.2d 447, 450-451 (Utah App. 1991). 
2. Does Michael Blackett have an unqualified right to have 
a hearing on or a resubmission of his objections to the Medical 
Panel Report? §35-1-77, U.C.A. (Appendix 2) 
3. If error at all, was it harmless error for the 
Industrial Commission of Utah not to further question evidence by 
the psychiatric member of the medical panel who concurred that 
there was no causal relationship between the May 1, 1990, 
industrial event and the current reported symptoms (R. 65-66, 69) 
but said that "...The patient could be suffering from a 
somatoform disorder....[and] that there was a possibility that 
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this diagnosis would be related to the May 1, 1990 injury"? (R. 
69) (Emphasis Added). Workers Compensation Fund v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 761 P.2d 572 (Ut. App. 1988). 
III. STANDARDS OP REVIEW 
1. The standard of review in analyzing findings of fact by 
an administrative body has been concisely stated in Stewart, 
supra.: 
Because these proceedings were commenced 
after January 1, 1988, our review is governed 
by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
(UAPA), Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-16 
(1989). The standard for reviewing findings 
of fact under UAPA is well settled. 
"[F]indings of fact will be affirmed if they 
are 'supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court'" Merriam v. Board of Review, 812 
P.2d 447, 450 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting 
Nelson v. Department of Employment Sec, 801 
P.2d 158, 161 (Utah App. 1990). "Substantial 
evidence is that which a reasonable person 
•might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.'" Id. (quoting Grace Drilling 
Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah 
App. 1989))... 
(Appendix 3) This applies to Issues 1 and 3. 
2. Interpretation of state statutes is a question of law. 
As such, the appellate court's standard of review is a correction 
of error standard, giving no deference to the agency's decision. 
Morton International v. Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 
(Utah 1991); Questar Pipeline v. Utah State Tax Commission, 817 
P.2d 316 (Utah 1991). This standard applies to Issue 2. 
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IV, DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
h. statutes. 
1. §35-1-77 U.C.A., Medical Panel - Medical Director 
or Medical Consultants - Discretionary Authority of Commission to 
Refer Case - Findings and Report - Hearing - Expenses. (Appendix 
No. 2) 
2. §35-1-88 U.C.A., Rules of Evidence and Procedure 
before Commission and Hearing Examiner - Admissible Evidence. 
(Appendix No. 4) 
B. Rule. 
R568-1-9, Industrial Commission Guidelines for 
Utilization of Medical Panel (Appendix No. 7) 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter is before the Court of Appeals pursuant to a 
Writ of Review (R. 101) from an Industrial Commission of Utah 
Order Denying Motion For Review dated April 2, 1992, (R. 96-100, 
Appendix 1). The Commission's Order affirmed an administrative 
law judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and Order dated 
January 24, 1992, (R. 77-83, Appendix 5) denying additional 
benefits to Michael Blackett. The Commission's denial was based 
in part on evidence derived from a Medical Panel Report received 
by the Commission September 13, 1991, (R. 55-69, Appendix 6) as 
well as all other evidence that had been presented by the 
parties. 
Mr. Blackett began the administrative process by filing an 
Application For Hearing dated November 1, 1990, in which he 
claimed an entitlement to additional workers' compensation 
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benefits for an alleged work related accidental fall injury he 
suffered during the course of his employment for Ralph Larsen & 
Sons, Inc. when he "fell off truck while filling radiator 
w/water" on May 1, 1990. (R. 37) The Workers Compensation Fund 
of Utah responded to the Application as the insurance carrier for 
Ralph Larsen & Sons, Inc. on December 13, 1990, by admitting that 
there had been an accident and that it had paid certain benefits. 
The Fund denied any further liability and asserted that any 
continuing complaints of injury were not causally related to the 
alleged event of May 1, 1990. (R.40-42) 
VI. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Preliminary 
It is Michael Blackett's (hereinafter "Blackett") burden to 
"...marshal the evidence in support of the [Industrial 
Commission's] findings and then demonstrate that those findings 
are unsupported by substantial evidence..." Stewart, supra, at 
185 Utah Adv. Rep. 32. He has made minimal, if any, attempt in 
his brief to marshal the evidence. The Statement of Material 
Facts in his brief while accurate to the extent the facts are 
given does not pretend to be a marshaling of the evidence in 
support of the Commission's decision. Rather, later in his 
brief, Blackett cites Nyren v. Industrial Commission, 800 P.2d 
330 (Ut. App. 1990), Cert. den. 815 P.2d 241 and without 
clarification states that the "...the Findings of Fact relied 
upon by the Administrative Law Judge/Industrial Commission are 
inadequate." (Appellant's Brief pp. 6-7) Failure to marshal 
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the evidence as required makes the Industrial Commission's 
findings conclusive. 
B. Facts. 
Defendants will marshal the substantial evidence which 
supports the Commission's denial of benefits. 
Blackett had serious back and hip injuries which predated 
his industrial accident of May 1, 1990. (R. 1-35) On November 
2, 1985, while he was employed by Mesa Moving and Storage, he was 
"...unloading a refrigerator down a walk board, fell off with 
refrig. [sic] on top of him. Injured lower back, [sic] left hip 
pain down left leg. Had surgery for a shattered disk." 
(Application for Hearing, December 3, 1986, R. 10) The surgery 
was performed at the St. Mark's Hospital by Dr. John C. Zahniser 
on November 13, 1985. (R. 283-290) Dr. Zahniser had treated 
Blackett beginning about 1978 for back problems associated with 
lifting heavy objects. (R. 300-307) Dr. Zahniser gave Mr. 
Blackett a permanent partial impairment rating of 20% with 10% 
caused by his industrial accident which resulted in the November, 
1985, surgery and 10% to conditions predating the surgery. (R. 
18) . 
On December 30, 1987, Dr. Gerald R. Moress who would later 
be the chairman of the Medical Panel examined Mr. Blackett on a 
referral from chiropractor, Dr. Richard Wright. The examination 
was for severe post-traumatic cervical muscle spasm and headaches 
as a result of a fall while he was carrying a microwave oven on 
December 24, 1987. Mr. Blackett had not remembered the headaches 
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and fall until reminded of them by Dr. Moress during the Medical 
Panel examination as reported on August 21, 1991. (R. 60, 64) 
On November 21, 1988, Western Rehabilitation Institute 
through Patricia Tobin, LPT, assessed Mr. Blackett's condition as 
follows: 
This pt represents a male who has been 
suffering with back pain off-and-on for 
approx 10 years, most severely has been the 
last year. In the past two years, the pain 
has encompassed this man's life, resulting in 
a chronic pain situation with decreased 
function and mobility. 
(R. 215) 
Before the accident in question, Mr. Blackett struggled 
psychologically with obesity, depression, his wife's personality 
and her ongoing pain problem. (R. 219-220, 222) 
He was off work under doctor's orders from E. Warren 
Stadler, M.D. to at least June 30, 1989. (R. 203) As late as 
April 25, 1990, the insurance carrier for Mesa Moving and Storage 
was awarded reimbursement for temporary total disability 
compensation from the Employer's Reinsurance Fund. (R. 34) 
The accident which is at issue occurred on May 1, 1990. At 
the time, Michael Blackett was employed by Ralph Larsen & Sons. 
He was filling the radiator of a truck with water when he fell. 
He received temporary total disability compensation from the 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah (hereinafter the "Fund") for in 
excess of five months. His medical expenses were likewise paid 
by the Fund. (R. 37) 
On the day of the injury Mr. Blackett reported to the Holy 
Cross Hospital for treatment. At that time he complained of and 
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was treated for an injury to his right forearm and wrist. He 
neither made complaint of nor did he give a history of striking 
his head or of experiencing any other injury. (R. 56, 275) He 
had no loss of consciousness with the fall that he could recall. 
As reported to the Medical Panel by Mr. Blackettf he had no head 
complaints until about one month after the accident when he was 
in physical therapy for his arm. (R. 56) 
On October 17, 1990, and again on May 22, 1991, neurologist 
Nathaniel M. Nord expressed the opinion to the Fund that: 
...J do not believe that Mr. Blackett has 
sustained intracranial/central nervous system 
injury or dysfunction as a consequence of the 
work-related incident of May 1, 1990. This 
opinion is shared, I believe, by Dr. Fred 
Matsuo, based upon my review of letters which 
he submitted to your office. 
(R. 112-122) 
Dr. Thomas D. Houts, M.D., who examined Mr. Blackett on a 
referral from his treating physician, Dr. Taylor A. Jeppson, 
likewise could find no objective signs of any disorder connected 
to his May 1, 1990, accident: 
The patient sounds like he is having a lot of 
physiologic headaches, mostly tension in type 
but with occasional migraines. He has had 
three episodes of syncope. These may be, in 
part, related to migraine or stress. I do 
not find evidence of an acquired neurological 
illness or organic brain syndrome. There 
does not appear to be any obvious evidence of 
brain injury from his head trauma... 
(R. 47-49) 
On August 21, 1991, the Medical Panel carefully considered 
all of the medical evidence and their own examinations of Mr. 
Blackett. Their conclusions were: 
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I find it incredulous that one would believe 
that Mr. Blackett has a post concussion 
syndrome/organic brain syndrome secondary to 
his May 1990 industrial incident. There is 
no evidence that he had any loss of 
consciousness whatsoever. There was no 
mention in the original emergency room notes 
of any problem with the headf and even Mr. 
Blackett admitted to several physicians that 
there was no loss of consciousness. In fact, 
he had no headaches develop, according to 
him, until a month after the incident and 
according to the medical records not until 
July. The headache mechanism appears to be 
related to cervical muscle strain and tension 
in agreement to many observers who have seen 
him....The bottom line is [his blackouts] do 
not represent any primary cerebral electrical 
even such as a seizure. This would be in 
agreement with the IME of Dr. Nord and 
opinion of Dr. Matsuo. 
Since there appears to be documentation on 
the record of an organic brain syndrome from 
his psychological evaluation, I would accept 
that. What I would not accept would be an 
attempt to find a causal relationship between 
non-existent head injury and the onset of an 
organic brain syndrome.... 
Rather than looking at the 5-1-90 accident as 
an isolated event, I feel it has to be looked 
at in terms of his premorbid problems 
including the 1985 back injury and the very 
prolonged recovery with much psychological 
overlay in his recovery. 
The Medical Panel went on to assert strongly its medical judgment 
that none of the symptoms then being experienced by Mr. Blackett 
were medically caused by the May 1, 1990, accident. (R. 64-66) 
Dr. Robert H. Burgoyne, the psychiatrist on the Medical Panel, 
concurred: ...J agree entirely with Dr. Moress's conclusions. 
My opinion is that there was no permanent partial impairment due 
to the industrial accident of May 1, 1990. (R. 69) 
Counsel for Mr. Blackett responded to the Medical Panel 
Report on October 15, 1991. He claimed an entitlement for Mr. 
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Blackett for Compensation Neurosis. He requested that the matter 
be referred back to the Medical Panel for a determination as 
regards the duration and extent of the psychological problems 
evidenced by Dr. Burgoyne's letter.... (R. 71) Counsel did not 
ask for a hearing nor did he term his letter an objection to the 
Medical Panel Report. 
Judge Timothy C. Allen entered his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order on January 24, 1992. (R. 77-82, 
Appendix 5). Judge Allen responded to the above request as 
follows: 
...[CJareful scrutiny of Dr. Burgoyne's 
findings indicates that the applicant "could 
be suffering from a somatoform disorder." 
(Emphasis added). Dr. Burgoyne goes on to 
indicate that "There was a possibility that 
this diagnosis would be related to the May 1, 
1990 injury." (Emphasis added) [T]he 
foregoing language of Dr. Burgoyne does not 
satisfy the evidentiary requirements in these 
matters. In these cases, medical evidence 
must be stated in terms of reasonable medical 
probability. 
(R. 77) Judge Allen admitted the report into evidence and 
adopted the findings as his own. (R. 78) He then entered his 
findings of fact citing many of the same facts stated 
hereinbefore as well as others in support of his denial of 
additional benefits. After reviewing the facts, the Industrial 
Commission sustained the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge. (R. 96-100, Appendix 1) 
Blackett's counsel then filed a timely Motion for Review. 
He asked that the matter be referred back to the Medical Panel 
for a full review of the alleged Compensation Neurosis. He did 
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not request a hearing on objections to the Medical Panel Report. 
(R. 84-85, Appendix 8) 
The refusal to refer the matter back to the Panel for 
clarification, if error at all, constitutes harmless errors in 
light of the record before this court. Workers Compensation Fund 
v. Industrial Comm'n, infra. 
VII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Argument A. When one is appealing from adverse findings of 
fact, the law requires the appellant to "...marshal the evidence 
in support of the ... findings and then demonstrate that those 
findings are unsupported by substantial evidence." Merriam v. 
Board of Review, supra. Blackett made little or no attempt at 
such marshaling. Instead, he ever so briefly argues the facts as 
one might do before a trier of facts. That is, he tried to paint 
the facts in a light most favorable to his position while 
excluding all facts that would be detrimental to his claim. That 
he does not like the result is a given. That there were indeed 
factual disputes regarding the causes of his very many physical, 
mental and emotional complaints is also a given. However, the 
disputed facts were resolved by the Commission contrary to 
Blackett1s interpretation. There was substantive evidence from 
the records of treating physicians, examining physicians who the 
Workers Compensation Fund retained and the evidence provided by 
the Medical Panel, all of which supports the denial of additional 
benefits. Contrary to Blackett1s unsupported implied assertion 
that the Commission misinterpreted Dr. Burgoyne's concurrence in 
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the report of Dr. Moress, the evidence overwhelmingly supports 
the Commission's findings. 
Argument B. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-77 makes it discretionary 
with the Commission to appoint a medical panel to review the 
medical evidence. It is also in the sound discretion of the 
Commission by the same statute to determine whether a hearing on 
objections to a medical panel report is to be held for the 
purpose of cross-examining the panel members, to resubmit the 
issues to the panel for clarification, or to decide that it has 
enough facts upon which to base its decision. In this case the 
panel unequivocally opined that none of Mr. Blackett's current 
problems were caused medically by his accident of May 1, 1990. 
If the trier of facts were to find the evidence of certain of Mr. 
Blackett's examining and treating physicians to be more credible, 
then he should receive the additional benefits he seeks. 
However, the trier of facts, the Industrial Commission, found the 
more credible evidence was against awarding more benefits. 
Furthermore, Blackett presented no new evidence that conflicted 
with the opinions expressed by the Medical Panel. He therefore 
did not comply with Industrial Commission Rule R568-1-9 B. 
(Appendix 7) which requires a proffer of conflicting medical 
evidence before the Commission will exercise its discretion to 
resubmit a matter to a medical panel. Without at least such a 
proffer, cross-examining the Panel is of no use. It was left for 
Blackett to convince the Commission that the evidence 
preponderated in his favor. He simply did not carry his burden 
of persuasion. 
11 
VIII. ARGUMENT 
A. BLACKETT FAILED TO MARSHAL ALL THE EVIDENCE WHICH 
SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION'S DECISION. HAD HE DONE 
SO, THE ONLY CONCLUSION ONE CAN REACH IS THAT A 
REASONABLE PERSON WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT THE FACTS 
AS BEING SUBSTANTIAL AND ADEQUATE TO SUPPORT THE 
COMMISSION'S DENIAL OF ADDITIONAL BENEFITS. 
It is Blackett's responsibility to ..."marshal the evidence 
in support of the [Commission's] findings and then demonstrate 
that those findings are unsupported by substantial evidence." 
Stewart v. Board of Review, supra.; Merriam v. Board of Review, 
supra. 
In any event, to successfully challenge 
findings of fact made in an administrative 
proceeding, the party seeking to upset those 
findings must show that the findings are "not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed 
in light of the whole record before the 
court." Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(g) 
(1990) . [Citation omitted] Under this "whole 
record test," a party challenging the 
findings must "marshal all of the evidence 
supporting the findings and show that despite 
the supporting facts, and in light of the 
conflicting or contradictory evidence, the 
findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence." [Citations omitted] 
In challenging the ALJ's decision, IHC 
catalogues only that evidence in the record 
most helpful to its position, and wholly 
neglects to amass the evidence supporting the 
ALJ's findings. Thus, IHC has 'failed to 
completely satisfy [its] obligation to 
marshal the evidence by persistently arguing 
[its] own position without regard for the 
evidence supporting the [ALJ's] findings". 
[Citations omitted] 
IHC v. Board of Review, P.2d , (Utah App. 1992), 193 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 33, at 30 (Ct. App. 8/14/92). 
...[EJvidence contrary to that supporting the 
findings should "be referred to in briefing 
only after the supporting evidence has been 
separately marshalled." [Citation omitted] 
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Since IHC has failed to comply with the 
marshaling requirement in this case, we have 
no occasion to consider the evidence 
supporting its position. 
id at footnote 3, page 33. 
By even a cursory reading of Blackett's brief, it is 
apparent he is implying this Court should reweigh the evidence in 
the most favorable light to support his claims. He is not 
satisfied with the fact finder's decisions. Ralph H. Larsen & 
Sons and the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah have documented 
the substantial facts supporting the Commission's denial of 
benefits. The Court is again referred to that summary in the 
Statement of Facts. 
B. THE EXERCISE OF THE DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY GIVEN 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION TO APPOINT A MEDICAL 
PANEL TO REVIEW THE MEDICAL ISSUES OF A CASE DOES 
NOT GIVE BLACKETT AN UNFETTERED RIGHT TO A HEARING 
ON OR A RESUBMISSION OF HIS OBJECTIONS TO THE 
MEDICAL PANEL REPORT. 
With little legal analysis and no citation to any legal 
authority in point in his brief at pages 5-7, Blackett asserts 
that "The ALJ should have referred the matter back to the medical 
panel or, in the alternative, held a hearing." (R. 5). 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-77 of the Workers' Compensation Act 
makes the appointment of a Medical Panel in any given case a 
discretionary act of the Commission. The Commission may base its 
findings on the Panel Report and in the event of timely 
objections may set a hearing on those objections: 
(1)(a) Upon the filing of a claim...the 
commission may refer the medical aspects of 
the case to a medical panel. 
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**** 
(2) (d) The commission may base its finding 
and decision on the report of the panel . . . 
or medical consultants, Jbut is not bound by 
the report if other substantial conflicting 
evidence in the case supports a contrary finding. 
(2) (e) If objections to the report are filed, the commission may set the case for 
hearing to determine the facts and issues 
involved. . . 
(2)(f) The written report of the panel . . . 
or medical consultants may be received as an 
exhibit at the hearing, but may not be 
considered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained by the testimony 
admitted. . . 
(emphasis added) (See §35-1-77 U.C.A., 1991 Cumulative 
Supplement, in its entirety attached as Appendix 4.) 
The language of the statute makes it clear Blackett does not 
have a statutory right to a hearing on his objections to the 
Medical Panel Report. The convening of such a hearing is 
discretionary with the Commission. Utah Appellate Courts have 
interpreted Utah Code Ann. §35-1-77(2)(e) in just that manner. 
Moore v. American Coal Co., 737 P.2d 989 (Utah 1987) and Rekward 
v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 755 P.2d 166 (Utah App. 1988). 
Blackett has not complied with Industrial Commission Rule 
R568-1-9 B: 
A hearing on objections to the panel report 
may be scheduled if there is a proffer of 
conflicting medical testimony showing a need 
to clarify the medical panel report. Where 
there is a proffer of new written conflicting 
medical evidence, the Administrative Law 
Judge may, in lieu of a hearing, resubmit 
the new evidence to the panel for 
consideration and clarification. 
14 
Blackett proffered no new conflicting medical evidence in 
any form. 
It was Blackett's burden to show his condition was medically 
caused by the accident of May 1, 1990, by a preponderance of the 
evidence: 
"Medical evidence is insufficient to prove 
industrial causation of any injury if it is 
equally probable that a nonindustrial 
accident caused the condition" [Citation 
omitted]; see also Allen v. Industrial 
Comm'n. 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986) . 
****** 
The standard of proof for causation is by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Large v. 
Industrial Comm'n. 758 P.2d 954, 956. 
Stokes v. Board of Review, 185 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 at 23 and 24 
(Ct. App. 4/22/92), Pet. for Cert, pending. He simply failed in 
that burden. 
It would have been a useless act in this case to have a 
hearing on the objections to the Medical Panel Report. As shown 
in the Statement of Facts, there is evidence from treating and 
examining physicians that fully supports the unequivocal opinions 
of the members of the medical panel. The most that a hearing on 
the Objections to the Medical Panel Report could have supplied 
was for the panel members to reassert their clear opinions of no 
causation. 
The Industrial Commission is solely responsible for finding 
facts. The determination of credibility is the sole province of 
the fact finder, not expert witnesses. The Commission was free 
to accept all or part of the Report and/or all or part of the 
other evidence presented by the parties as its findings. It is 
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for the Commission to weigh the evidence. See for example, 
Greyhound Lines v. Wallace, 728 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1986); Booms v. 
Rapp Construction Company, 720 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1986); Price River 
Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 731 P.2d (Utah 1986). The 
Commission is not required to give preferential weight to a 
treating physician's findings. Rushton v. Gelco Express, 732 
P.2d 109 (Utah 1986). 
The very worst that can be said about the Commission's 
decision not to have a hearing or refer the matter back to the 
panel for further findings based on Blackett's objection to the 
Medical Panel Report is that it would make the report "hearsay". 
However, the "hearsay rule" has no application in a Commission 
proceeding. The administrative law judge and the Commission may 
consider any hearsay evidence presented to them which bears on 
the issues being considered. Schmidt v. Industrial Comm'n, 617 
P.2d 693 (Utah 1980); Bunnell v. Industrial Comm'n, 740 P.2d 1331 
(Utah 1987). The only restrictions to the admission of hearsay 
evidence are: 1) that the evidence have some probative weight and 
reliability, Bunnell v. Industrial Comm'n, supra.; and that 
findings of fact not be based exclusively on hearsay. There must 
be a residuum of legal and competent substantive evidence. That 
residuum requirement can be met by evidence which is either 
admitted without objection or is otherwise allowed as evidence by 
rule or statute. See, for example, Industrial Power v. 
Industrial Commission, 187 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (Ct. App. 5/13/92). 
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-88 (Appendix No.4) provides: 
The commission may receive as evidence and 
use as proof of any fact in dispute all 
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evidence deemed material and relevant 
including, but not limited to the following: 
**** 
(b) Reports of attending or examining 
physicians, or of pathologists. 
(c) Reports of investigators appointed 
by the commission. 
(d) Reports of employers, including 
copies of time sheets, book accounts or other 
records. 
(e) Hospital records in the case of an 
injured or diseased employee. 
(Emphasis added). Obviously this statute and the overall concept 
of the Workers' Compensation Act of Utah (Utah Code Ann. Sections 
35-1-1 et seq.) contemplates admission of material that would 
otherwise be considered "hearsay" to which one would not have the 
opportunity of cross-examination. The concept is that if the 
"...the usual common-law or statutory rules of evidence, 
or...technical or formal rules of procedure..." were to be 
applied/ the purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act to 
provide speedy, inexpensive resolution of disputed issues dealing 
with employees' rights to compensation would be thwarted. 
Certainly, if a party had the absolute right to cross-examine 
every person or entity supplying hearsay evidence, the system 
would be so burdened that it could never meet its purposes. That 
is why the Commission is given the discretionary authority to 
appoint a Medical Panel and discretionary authority to determine 
whether objections to Medical Panel Reports establish sufficient 
factual controversy to set a hearing to examine the issues 
further. Here, the Commission correctly found that the objection 
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-88. 
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added nothing materially different to the facts and merely 
constituted additional adversarial argument because the evidence 
relied upon by Blackett from the report of Dr. Burgoyne " does 
not meet the evidentiary requirements in these matters. In 
workers compensation cases, medical evidence must be stated in 
terms of reasonable medical probability." (R. 96-100 at 97, 
Appendix 6 hereto.) 
The right of cross-examination is not an absolute right. 
Cellular Mobile Systems of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Federal 
Communications Commission, 782 F.2d 182, 198 (Ct. App. D.C. Dist. 
1985) involved a claim that the FCC was required to give a full 
hearing to applicants for a nonwire line cellular telephone 
license and that the hearing should involve cross-examination of 
witnesses. The Court Said: 
Cross-examination is therefore not an 
automatic right conferred by the APA, 
instead, its necessity must be established 
under specific circumstances by the party 
seeking it. The APA . . . provides only for 
"such cross-examination as may be required 
for a full and true disclosure of the facts . 
. . In this case-by-case analysis, cross-
examination is appropriately denied if the 
party fails to "point to any specific 
weakness in the proof which might have been 
explored or developed more fully by that 
technique than by the procedures adopted by 
the Commission, or fails specifically to 
suggest what questions were necessary to 
explore the general issues to be examined, or 
fails to explain why written submissions, 
including rebuttal material, were 
ineffectual. Absent such a showing, no 
prejudice has been established . . . Cross-
examination is not essential in all cases; 
instead, this traditional device of truth-
finding is deemed to lie within the 
discretion of the ALJ, whose decision will 
not be reversed by the Commission if it 
reflects sound discretion. Even if a party 
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successfully argues under this standard that 
cross-examination should have been permitted, 
the second inquiry is whether the matters 
sought to be cross-examined bore 
significantly upon the Commission's fact 
finding and drawing of conclusions. If not, 
then the party has not been prejudiced. 
Due to the vagueness of Blackett's argument, it is difficult 
to argue with more particularity against his assertions of a 
right to have the matter referred back to the panel or to cross-
examination of the Medical Panel. The proponent of a 
proposition, after all, bears the burden of proof and persuasion 
as to the proposition. Loesling v. Basamkis, 539 P.2d 1043, 1046 
(Utah 1975); Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Utah 1987). 
That burden has not been met. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Blackett's appeal to this Court to have the case remanded 
with instructions to the Industrial Commission to have his 
objections to the Medical Panel Report resubmitted to the Panel 
for further consideration or in the alternative to have the 
Commission convene a hearing on the objections to the Medical 
Panel Report should fail for several reasons. First, the 
referral to the Medical Panel and the convening of a hearing on 
objections to the Panel's report are discretionary with the 
Commission pursuant to §35-1-77 U.C.A. The Commission used its 
discretion to determine that nothing could be added to the case 
that had not already been considered by the Panel. 
Second, Blackett did not comply with Industrial Commission 
Rule R568-1-9 B. which requires an objecting party to proffer new 
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conflicting medical testimony showing a need to clarify the 
medical panel report . . . . All Blackett did was argue that the 
Panel members Drs. Burgoyne and Moress disagreed with one 
another. He chose not to believe Dr. Burgoyne when he said, I 
agree entirely with Dr. Moress's conclusions. My opinion is that 
there was no permanent partial impairment due to the industrial 
accident of May 1, 1990... (R. 69) The Commission chose to take 
Dr. Burgoyne at his word. 
Third, Blackett has totally failed to marshal the evidence 
in support of the Commission's findings and then show they are 
unsupported by substantial evidence. Instead he has provided the 
Court with slightly more than one page of "Material Facts", none 
of which support his burden to show medical causation by a 
preponderance of the evidence. (See Blackett's Brief at pages 3-
4) 
Defendants ask this Court to sustain the decision of the 
Industrial Commission denying Michael Blackett's application for 
additional workers' compensation benefits stemming from his 
accident of May 1, 1990, and that the case and record be remitted 
to the Industrial Commission for action consistent therewith. 
DATED this I day of October, 1992. 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKEI 
R. BLACI 
unsel for Ralph H. Larsen 
Sons and Workers 
bmpensation Fund of Utah 
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DEBORAH M. LARSEN 
Cocounsel for Ralph H. Larsen & 
Sons and Workers Compensation 
Fund of Utah 
61940-1 
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Order Denying Motion For Review 
dated April 2, 1992. (R. 96-100) 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 86001152 
MICHAEL BLACKETT, * 
Applicant, * ORDER 
vs. * DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
RALPH H. LARSON & SONS, INC. * 
6 WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND * 
OF UTAH, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The Industrial Commission of Utah, on Motion of the Applicant, 
Michael Blackett, reviews an Order of the Administrative Law Judge 
dated January 24, 1992, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-
82.53 and Section 63-46b-12. 
On January 24, 1992, an Order was entered by an Administrative 
Law Judge of the Commission wherein it was concluded that the 
Applicant was not entitled to permanent total disability, permanent 
partial impairment and additional temporary total disability 
benefits as the result of his industrial accident of May 1, 1991. 
On January 26, 1992, the Commission received a Motion for 
Review from the Applicant alleging that Administrative Law Judge 
Allen erred in failing to refer the question of whether the 
Applicant suffered from "Compensation Neurosis" back to the medical 
panel for a full analysis of whether the somatoform pain disorder 
was cause the industrial accident. 
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire Commission 
for review. It is the opinion of the Commission that the issues to 
be decided are: 1) whether the Administrative Law Judge erred in 
failing to refer the question of whether the Applicant suffered 
from "Compensation Neurosis" back to the medical panel; and 2) 
whether Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law are supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light 
of the whole record? 
A report from the psychiatric member of the panel, Dr. 
Burgoyne, was forwarded to the parties as a supplemental panel 
report. In response thereto, applicant made a Motion to Amend 
Application for Hearing to allege that the applicant was suffering 
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from compensation neurosis, based on applicant's reading of the 
findings of Dr. Burgoyne. However, in reviewing the report of Dr. 
Burgoyne, and the rest of the medical evidence contained on this 
file, the Administrative Law Judge found that the applicant 
mischaracterized Dr. Burgoyne's report. 
The applicant asserts that Dr. Burgoyne clearly indicated that 
the applicant suffers from a somatoform pain disorder and that this 
is a result of the industrial accident. However, scrutiny of Dr. 
Burgoyne's findings indicates that the applicant "could be 
suffering from a somatoform disorder." (Emphasis added). Dr. 
Burgoyne goes on to indicate that "There was a possibility that 
this diagnosis would be related to the May 1, 1990 injury." 
(Emphasis added). The foregoing language of Dr. Burgoyne does not 
satisfy the evidentiary requirements in these matters. In workers 
compensation cases, medical evidence must be stated in terms of 
reasonable medical probability. 
It is for this very reason that the medical panel in its 
charge is always instructed by the Industrial Commission to couch 
its findings in terms of "reasonable medical probability". The 
Commission finds that the better view of Dr. Burgoyne's conclusions 
is that any somatoform pain disorder that the applicant might have 
is related to his previous psychological makeup, since Dr. Burgoyne 
found that there was no organic pathology, and that the applicant's 
of pain or impairment was in excess of what would be expected from 
his physical findings. However, this observation by Dr. Burgoyne 
is not clear proof of "compensation neurosis" as alleged by the 
applicant. Rather, other than the applicant's mischaracterization 
of Dr. Burgoyne's findings, there is no medical evidence whatsoever 
to support the applicant's contention that he suffers "compensation 
neurosis" as the result of the industrial accident. 
The medical panel found that there was no post concussion 
syndrome/organic brain syndrome due to the industrial accident of 
May 1, 1990. The panel noted that there was no evidence whatsoever 
that the applicant had any loss of consciousness. In addition, 
there was no mention in the original emergency room notes of any 
problem with the applicant's head, and further, the applicant 
himself admitted to several physicians that there was no loss of 
consciousness. Of particular importance, is the fact that the 
applicant had no headaches develop until, according to the 
applicant, a month after the incident, and according to the medical 
records, not until July of 1990. The medical panel concluded that 
the headache mechanism was related to the cervical muscle strain, 
and that the applicant's blackouts are a syncopal-like episode, or 
that they are some type of dissociative psychological reaction. 
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Finally, the panel concluded that the applicant has "An 
organic brain syndrome from his psychological evaluation. . . ." 
The panel concluded that there was no causal relationship between 
the "Non-existent head injury and the onset of an organic brain 
syndrome. An organic brain syndrome would be related to factors 
other than his 5-1-90 industrial incident." The panel noted 
further careful scrutiny should be made of the applicant's pre-
accident problems, "Including the 1985 back injury and the very 
prolonged recovery with much psychological overlay in his 
recovery." 
The panel also found that the applicant was status post 
L5-S1 laminectomy, discectomy, and finally, that the applicant had 
an organic brain syndrome, the etiology of which was unclear, but 
the panel concluded that it possibly was neurodegenerative. The 
panel concluded that the foregoing diagnosis were not a result of 
the industrial accident of May 1, 1990. The panel found, in 
addition, that the applicant's condition stabilized from the 
industrial accident approximately one month following the accident 
or June 1, 1990. The findings of the medical panel were adopted by 
the Administrative Law Judge as his own and admitted into evidence. 
Based upon these medical findings the Administrative Law Judge 
did not err in failing to refer the issue of "compensation 
neurosis" back to the medical panel. The panel had dealt with the 
issue of the applicant's somatoform pain disorder and psychological 
overlay at some length. In addition, the Administrative Law 
Judge's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court. 
For the foregoing reasons, it is the opinion of the Commission 
that the Administrative Law Judges' Order denying the applicant 
worker's compensation benefits related to the May 1, 1991, 
industrial accident should be affirmed. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Review, 
dated January 22, 1992, is hereby denied. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within thirty (30) days of the date hereof 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 
63-46b-16. Costs to prepare transcripts for appeals purposes shall 
be borne by the party requesting the transcripts. 
Stephen.M. Hadley 
Commissioner 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Certified this ^ W^f day of April 1992. 
ATTEST: 
Patricia O. Ashby^ ~L, 
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Appendix Number 2 
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-77 
1991 Cumulative Supplement 
Medical Panel - Medical Director or 
Medical Consultants 
Discretionary Authority of Commission 
to Refer Case 
Findings and Report - Hearing -
Expenses 
35-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or medical con-
sultants — Discretionary authority of commis-
sion to refer case — Findings and reports — Ob-
jections to report — Hearing — Expenses. 
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or 
for death, arising out of and in the course of employment, and if the 
employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may 
refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the 
commission. 
(b) When a claim for compensation based upon disability or death due 
to an occupational disease is filed with the commission, the commission 
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shall, except upon stipulation of all parties, appoint an impartial medical 
panel. 
(0 A medical panel shall consist of one or more physicians specializing 
in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in the claim. 
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evalua-
tion of the medical aspects of a controverted case, the commission in its 
sole discretion may employ a medical director or medical consultants on a 
tull-time or part-time basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical 
evidence and advising the commission with respect to its ultimate fact-
finding responsibility. If all parties agree to the use of a medical director 
or medical consultants, they shall be allowed to function in the same 
, ™
n i . r ***• under the same procedures as required of a medical panel 
U) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shali 
make such study, take such X rays, and perform such tests, including 
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the commission, as it may 
determine to be necessary or desirable. 
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall 
make a report in writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the 
commission, and also make such additional findings as the commission 
may require. In occupational disease cases, the panel shall certify to the 
commission the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from per-
forming work for remuneration or profit, and whether the sole cause of 
the disability or death, in the opinion of the panel, results from the occu-
pational disease and whether any other causes have aggravated pro-
longed, accelerated, cr in any way contributed to the disability or death 
and if so, the extent in percentage to which the other causes have so 
contributed. 
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the report to 
the applicant, the employer, and its insurance carrier by registered mail 
with return receipt requested. Within 15 days after the report is deposited 
in the United States post office, the applicant, the employer, or its insur-
ance earner may file with the commission written objections to the re-
port. If no written objections are filed within that period, the report is 
considered admitted in evidence. 
(d) The commission may base its finding and decision on the report of 
the panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by 
the report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case sunnorts a 
contrary finding. HH"*««* 
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the commission may set the case 
for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved. At the hearing 
any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman 
of the medical panel, the medical director, or the medical consultants 
present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good 
cause shown, the commission may order other members of the panel, with 
or without the chairman or the medical director or medical consultants, to 
be present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. ' 
(f) The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical consul-
tants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be consid-
ered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained bv the te«?ti 
mony admitted. 
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(g) The expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical 
director, or medical consultants and the expenses of their appearance 
before the commission shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 52, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 42-1-71.10; L. 1955, ch. 57, § 1; 1969, 
ch. 86, § 9; 1979, ch. 138, § 6; 1982, ch. 41, 
§ 1; 1988, ch. 116, § 7; 1991, ch. 136, § 13. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29. 1991, substituted the 
first "and" for "or" in Subsection (l)(a) and de-
Effect of 1982 amendment. 
Referral to panel. 
— Discretion. 
Cited. 
Effect of 1982 amendment 
In accord with bound volume. See Ortiz v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 766 P.2d 1092 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
This section is procedural and may be ap-
plied to an accident that occurred pnor to the 
1982 amendments. Ortiz v. Industrial Comm'n, 
101 Utah Adv Rep. 60 (Ct. App. 1989). 
leted the former second sentence, which read 
"The panel shall have the qualifications gener-
ally applicable to the medical panel under Sec-
tion 35-2-56"; added Subsections (1Kb) and (c) 
and redesignated former Subsection (1Kb) as 
(l)(d); and added the second sentence in Sub-
section (2Kb). 
—Discretion. 
The court of appeals cannot say that the ad-
ministrative law judge abused his discretion in 
not referring the case to a medical panel when 
there was medical evidence to support his find-
ing of medical causation. Workers' Comp. Fund 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 761 P.2d 572 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
Cited in Rekward v. Industrial Comm'n, 755 
P.2d 166 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); USX Corp. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 781 P.2d 883 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Referral to panel. 
Tab 3 
Appendix Number 3 
Stewart v. Board of Review 
831 P.2d 134 
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Cite as 
185 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Jennie STEWART, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BOARD OF REVIEW of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah; Warner Lambert/ 
AmericanChickle; and Underwriters Adjusting 
Company, 
Respondents. 
No. 910425-CA 
FILED: April 29, 1992 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
ATTORNEYS: 
Lowell V. Summerhays, Murray, for 
Petitioner 
Henry K. Chai, II, Salt Lake City, for 
Respondents Warner Lambert/American 
Chickle and Underwriters Adjusting 
Company 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and 
Jackson. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Petitioner Jennie Stewart appeals the Indu-
strial Commission's denial of certain benefits 
sought by Stewart. We affirm. 
FACTS* 
On July 31, 1984, Stewart experienced a 
pain in her right shoulder while lifting boxes 
in the course of her employment duties. 
Stewart did not report the injury to her emp-
loyer, respondent American Chickle (Chickle), 
nor did she seek immediate medical treatment. 
Stewart continued to work and first sought 
medical treatment on August 27, 1984. At that 
time she saw Dr. Jerry Poulson, her family 
physician, who referred her to Dr. Devon 
Toone, a chiropractor. Stewart did not 
mention any specific industrial injury to Dr. 
Poulson. Dr. Toone first saw Stewart on 
October 10 and continued treating her until 
May of 1985. Dr. Toone's records indicate 
that Stewart reported the injury had occurred 
at work while she was lifting boxes. In a 
subsequent report completed by Dr. Poulson, 
the date of injury was stated as July 1984. 
In a report dated November 7, 1984, 
Stewart reported the injury to her employer. 
In that report, Stewart indicated she did not 
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know how the injury occurred. 
Dr. Thomas Soderburg, an orthopedic 
surgeon, examined Stewart on May 1, 1985. 
Both Dr. Soderburg and Dr. Kim Bertin, 
another orthopedic surgeon, opined that 
Stewart had a muscle strain of her right sho-
ulder. Stewart continued working until Sept-
ember 12, 1985. On that date, Dr. Bertin 
hospitalized Stewart and performed an acro-
mioplasty of her right shoulder. Stewart rec-
eived temporary total compensation from 
workers' compensation from September 12, 
1985 through March 26, 1986. On March 19, 
1986, Dr. Bertin gave Stewart a permanent 
partial impairment rating of four percent of 
the upper extremity which he converted to a 
two percent whole person permanent rating. 
Chickle, through its insurance carrier, tend-
ered a compensation agreement and check to 
Stewart to compensate her for a 2.4 percent 
whole person impairment. Stewart disputed 
this rating. 
When Stewart's temporary total disability 
benefits were terminated in March of 1986, 
she began receiving long-term disability 
benefits. After an unrelated hospitalization in 
September of 1986, Stewart returned to Dr. 
Bertin with complaints of shoulder pain. Dr. 
Bertin referred Stewart to Dr. Bruce Sorenson 
to determine if Stewart's shoulder pain was 
being caused by some cervical abnormality. 
Several tests were performed and all results 
were normal. Neither Dr. Bertin nor Dr. 
Sorenson could determine the source of 
Stewart's pain and Dr. Bertin concluded 
Stewart should seek further consultation to 
make sure nothing was being overlooked. 
On August 25, 1987, Stewart was involved 
in an automobile accident. The collision 
caused the dashboard of the vehicle to be 
pushed into her right arm which in turn 
pushed Stewart's right shoulder back. The 
armrest of the passenger door struck Stewart 
on the right side below her ribs. A few days 
later, Stewart sought medical treatment from 
Dr. Poulson. Dr. Poulson's records indicate 
Stewart had a bruise to the right shoulder and 
arm as well as pain in her neck. The records 
also indicate that Dr. Poulson concluded that 
Stewart's problems resulting from the indus-
trial accident had resolved and that they were 
not contributing to the problems from the 
automobile accident. He provided fifteen tre-
atments which ended in March of 1988, all of 
which were for treatment of the neck and 
dorsal back. In a letter to Stewart's counsel 
dated March 3, 1988, Dr. Poulson reported 
two separate injuries. He attributed Stewart's 
pain in her right shoulder to the 1984 indust-
rial accident and gave a two percent whole 
person impairment rating for that injury. Dr. 
Poulson attributed the cervical spine, dorsal 
spine, and right shoulder injuries to the aut-
omobile accident and gave a ten percent whole 
person rating for that injury. Dr. Poulson 
concluded that most if not all of the pain 
Stewart was experiencing in her shoulder was 
due to pain from her cervical spine area. 
At the request of the long-term disability 
insurance carrier, two additional physicians 
examined Stewart. Those physicians' reports 
indicate that they believed the industrial acci-
dent was responsible for Stewart's pain. The 
administrative law judge (ALJ)2 found that 
neither of these physicians were informed 
about the automobile accident or about Dr. 
Poulson's conclusions. A medical panel con-
sisting of one physician reviewed the case and 
submitted a report to the ALJ on June 6, 
1989. The findings of the medical panel are 
summarized by the ALJ as follows: 
The medical panel felt that the 
applicant's complaints were cervical 
in nature, rather than shoulder, and 
that the applicant had a lot of 
subjective complaints without obj-
ective findings. The medical panel 
found a causal connection between 
the right shoulder problems and the 
industrial accident, and gave the 
applicant a 5Vo upper extremity 
rating which converts to a 3Vo 
whole person. The panel also found 
that the impairment led to a 30% 
disability, which was beyond its 
charge. In a supplemental panel 
report issued April 3, 1990, the 
medical panel concluded that the 
automobile accident did not cause 
any significant damage to the app-
licant's right shoulder. The panel 
concluded that all of the applicant's 
current complaints are related to a 
cervical disc injury ... (which] was 
caused by the industrial accident of 
1984, and was accentuated by the 
automobile accident. 
The ALJ rejected the medical panel's finding 
that there was a causal connection between 
Stewart's cervical complaints and the 1984 
industrial accident. The ALJ found there was 
no medical evidence to support that finding, 
and that therefore, Stewart's cervical injury 
resulted from her automobile accident and not 
the industrial accident. 
The ALJ concluded that Stewart was enti-
tled to a three percent whole person impair-
ment as found by the medical panel, that 
Chickle had no responsibility for treatment 
resulting from the automobile accident, that 
Chickle was not responsible for the medical 
expenses of the two physicians to whom the 
long-term disability carrier had referred 
Stewart, and that ail future medical expenses 
were Stewart's responsibility. Stewart moved 
for review whereupon the Industrial Commi-
ssion affirmed the ALJ's findings and concl-
usions. 
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ISSUES 
Stewart challenges the ALJ's rejection of 
the medical panels conclusion that her 
current injury was caused by the industrial 
accident. Stewart further claims that the Ind-
ustrial Commission failed to determine all 
findings of fact, and that there is credible 
evidence in the record to support a conclusion 
that the industrial accident caused all of 
Stewart's injuries. Stewart asks this court to 
conclude that Chickle is liable for all present 
and future medical expenses incurred as a 
result of that accident.3 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Because these proceedings were commenced 
after January 1, 1988, our review is governed 
by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
(UAPA), Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 
(1989). The standard for reviewing findings of 
fact under UAPA is well settled. " [Findings 
of fact will be affirmed if they are 'supported 
by substantial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record before the court.'* Merriam 
v. Board of Review, 812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah 
App. 1991) (quoting Nelson v. Department of 
Employment Sec., 801 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah 
App. 1990)). "Substantial evidence is that 
which a reasonable person 'might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion.'" Id. 
(quoting Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of 
Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989)). In 
conducting this review, we examine both sides 
of the record, and not simply that part of the 
record which supports the ALJ's findings. 
Tasters Ltd. v. Department of Employment 
Sec., 819 P.2d 361,365 (Utah App. 1991). 
ANALYSIS 
On review, Stewart makes a general claim 
that her current pain is a result of the 1984 
industrial accident, and not, as the ALJ det-
ermined, a result of the 1987 automobile acc-
ident. She thus challenges the ALJ's factual 
findings and the ALJ's rejection of the 
medical panel's opinion which agreed with 
Stewart's position. 
While Stewart apparently disagrees with the 
ALJ's factual findings, she fails to challenge 
those findings. As noted above, we will not 
disturb findings unless Stewart can demonst-
rate they are not supported by substantial 
evidence. See Merriam v. Board of Review, 
812 P.2d 447, 450-51 (Utah App. 1991); Grace 
Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 
63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). Stewart's challenge 
to the ALJ's findings falls short of this req-
uirement. 
After stating that, "[i]n marshaling all the 
evidence in support of the decision, the petit-
ioner sees that there is no credible evidence to 
do so," Stewart identifies the marshaling 
burden and cites to evidence in the record 
upon which the ALJ relied in making his fin-
dings.4 On this point, Stewart comes close to 
meeting her burden ,of presenting evidence 
which supports the very findings she contests. 
However, Stewart fails to draw this court's 
attention to any flaw in the evidence upon 
which the ALJ relied. See West Valley City v. 
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah 
App. 1991) (appellant acknowledged marsha-
ling requirement but "misperceived it"). Acc-
ordingly, because she does not marshal the 
evidence in support of the ALJ's findings and 
then demonstrate that those findings are uns-
upported by substantial evidence, we accept 
the ALJ's findings as conclusive.5 See Merriam, 
812P.2dat450. 
CONCLUSION 
We accept the ALJ's determination that the 
1984 industrial injury is not responsible for 
Stewart's current pain. Accordingly, we 
affirm. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1. We accept the Industrial Commission's findings 
of fact as conclusive because, as discussed later in 
this opinion, Stewart has failed to challenge these 
findings. 
2. This case was originally heard by Judge Gilbert 
Martinez, who took it under advisement and refe-
rred the matter to a medical panel. Before the 
medical panel submitted its report, Judge Martinez 
left the Industrial Commission. Judge Timothy 
Allen was then assigned to the case. His findings of 
fact and conclusions of law state that he reviewed 
the transcript of the evidentiary hearing before 
Judge Martinez as well as the complete record, 
before rendering his decision. Unless otherwise 
specified, this opinion's reference to the ALJ refers 
to Judge Allen. 
3. Stewart filed a reply brief which Chickle has 
moved this court to strike. In her reply brief, 
Stewart raises issues which were not raised before 
the Industrial Commission, in her docketing state-
ment to this court, or in her initial appellate brief. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 23(c) limits the 
material contained in reply briefs to "answering any 
new matter set forth in the opposing brief." Because 
Stewart's brief fails to comply with this rule, we 
decline to address the issues raised therein. 
4. Stewart cites to a medical report submitted by her 
physician, Dr. Poulson, which states that the pain 
Stewart was experiencing from the cervical area 
resulted from the automobile accident. She also 
states that because the two physicians who evaluated 
her at the request of the long-term disability insu-
rance carrier did not have relevant medical records, 
their opinions that the industrial accident caused her 
present pain should be rejected. 
5. We note that even were we to overlook Stewart's 
failure to comply with our marshaling requirement 
and reach the merits of this issue, the outcome 
would be no different. 
The record is replete with documentation suppo-
rting the finding that Stewart's current pain resulted 
from the 1987 automobile accident. Stewart was 
treated for shoulder pain prior to the automobile 
accident. No cervical damage was ever diagnosed as 
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resulting from the 1984 industrial accident. After the 
automobile accident, Stewart was treated for cerv-
ical problems which even her own family physician 
determined to have resulted solely from the autom-
obile accident. The medical records reveal that 
Stewart's neck was free from anatomical or functi-
onal abnormality as late as June of 1987, when she 
received an MRI scan. In short, sufficient evidence 
supports the ALJ's factual findings. 
Further, while the ALJ rejected the medical 
panel's conclusion that the automobile accident 
accentuated Stewart's pain, the ALJ did adopt the 
impairment rating determined by the panel. Stewart 
fails to show how an alleged error in the ALJ's 
factual findings made any difference in this outcome 
on this point. As to whether the ALJ erred in reje-
cting the causation finding made by the medical 
panel, it was clearly within his discretion to do so. See 
Olsen v. Industrial Comm'ny 797 P.2d 1098, 
1100 (Utah 1990) (appropriate for ALJ to reject 
medical opinions which are not supported by cred-
ible evidence); Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P.2d 
237, 241 (Utah 1987) (when medical evidence is 
conflicting, ALJ has duty to resolve factual conf-
lict). 
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Appendix Number 4 
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-88 
Rules of Evidence and Procedure 
before Commission and Hearing 
Examiner 
Admissible Evidence 
35-1-88. Rules of evidence and procedure before commis-
sion and hearing examiner — Admissible evi-
dence. 
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner shall be bound by the 
usual common-law or statutory rules of evidence, or by any technical or for-
mal rules of procedure, other than as herein provided or as adopted by the 
commission pursuant to this act. The commission may make its investigation 
in such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substan-
tial rights of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. 
The commission may receive as evidence and use as proof of any fact in 
dispute all evidence deemed matenal and relevant including, but not limited 
to the following: 
(a; Depositions and sworn testimony presented in open hearings. 
(b) Reports of attending or examining physicians, or of pathologists. 
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by the commission. 
(d) Reports of employers, including copies of time sheets, book accounts 
or other records. 
(e) Hospital records in the case of an injured or diseased employee. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 88: C.L. 1917, Meaning of "this act". — See same catch-
§ 3148; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-82; L. 1965, line in notes following § 35-1-46 
ch* 67, $ 1. Cross-References. — Rules for procedure of 
commission, § 35-1-10 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Admissibility and competency of evidence. 
Appearance. 
Burden of proof. 
Conduct of proceedings before commission. 
Constitutional rights of parties. 
Delegation of power to take testimony. 
General construction. 
Hearsay. 
Judicial notice. 
Jury trial. 
Raising and waiving objections. 
Rehearing. 
Stipulations. 
Stipulation to take testimony. 
Taking testimony. 
Taking testimony — admissibility and competency of evidence. 
Weight and sufficiency of evidence. 
Cited. 
Admissibility and competency of evidence. 
While Industrial Commission in its investi-
gations may have recourse to hearsay evidence 
to assist it at arriving at real facts, when it 
makes its findings every finding of fact must 
be based on some substantial legal and compe-
tent evidence, and every material finding that 
is entirely based on hearsay or other incompe-
tent evidence not supported by substantial evi-
dence cannot be permitted to stand if properly 
assailed. Garfield Smelting Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 53 Utah 133, 178 P. 57 (1918). 
Industrial Commission erred in permitting 
some witnesses to testify as to the statements 
made by deceased employee before he died, and 
other witnesses to state their conclusions or 
inferences m violation of rule limiting admis-
sion of incompetent evidence before commis-
sion. Rockefeller v. Industrial Comm'n, 58 
Utah 124. 197 P. 1038 (1921). 
In view of provisions of this section, 
N 35-1-78, 35-1-85 (now repealed) and 
35-1-86, commission may deny award to non-
resident alien father of deceased employee, 
though evidence of partial dependency was un-
contradicted where evidence was somewhat 
fragmentary and not in all respects satisfac-
tory or convincing, being mostly depositions 
and letters, but commission may not arbitrar-
ily or capriciously deny award. Kavalinakis v. 
industrial Comm'n, 67 Utah 174, 246 P. 698 
' 1926). 
In proceeding for compensation for death of 
mmer, declaration of deceased made to his 
companion when rocks were falling that he had 
been hit in back with rock was part or res ges-
tae and evidence as to that was not open to 
objection that it was hearsay. Chief Consol. 
Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 70 Utah 333, 
260 P. 271 (1927). 
Whether the present disabilities are or are 
not attributable to the injuries received at time 
of accident, when constituting the ultimate 
fact or question to be determined by the com-
mission, may be decided without accepting a 
mere opinion of an expert. Utah Delaware 
Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Utah 187, 
289 P. 94 (1930). 
In proceeding for compensation for death of 
city employee who died from acute dilatation 
or collapse of heart resulting from overexertion 
or strain while working on reservoir, declara-
tions of deceased to doctor as to nature and 
extent of pain and as to nature of work, and 
declarations to wife as to pain were admissible, 
as against contention that such evidence was 
hearsay. Hammond v. Industrial Comm'n, 84 
Utah 67, 34 P.2d 687 (1934). 
Whether an employee is totally disabled or 
permanently disabled are ultimate matters to 
be decided by the commission, as is also 
amount and time compensation may be 
awarded upon all the evidence; and upon these 
ultimate questions expert witnesses may not 
properly express opinions, nor may such opin-
ions relating to loss of bodily function become 
measure of compensable function possessed by 
an employee prior to his injury. Spencer v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 87 Utah 336, 40 P.2d 188, 
affd, 87 Utah 358, 48 P.2d 1120 (1935). 
All transmitted evidence, such as declara-
tions and statements by employee to another, 
have been held to be incompetent. Nor is com-
mission compelled to accept circumstantial evi-
dence and where evidence of accident is ail 
hearsay, mere narratives of a past event, with 
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no element of spontaneity, it is inadmissible. 
Boyd v Industrial Comm'n. 88 Utah 173, 48 
P.2d 498 (1936), rehearing denied, 88 Utah 
184, 53 P.2d 80 (1935). 
When the matter is one within the knowl-
edge of laymen, the Industrial Commission 
need not decide according to testimony given 
by experts. Caillet v. Industrial Comm'n, 90 
Utah 8, 58 P.2d 760 (1936). 
Industrial Commission is not bound to accept 
opinion of physician testifying as an expert un-
less such is the only reasonable conclusion to 
reach in the premises. Ellis v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 91 Utah 432. 64 P.2d 363 (1937). 
Commission is not bound to follow opinion of 
expert as to whether claimant has suffered 
total permanent disability, but may make its 
own finding from consideration of all the evi-
dence. Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n. 93 Utah 
493, 73 P.2d 1308 (1937). 
This section plainly changes the rules of evi-
dence in cases within the act l§ 35-1-1 et seq.). 
It authorizes the commission to receive and 
consider any kind of evidence that may throw 
light on a pending claim. The statute, however, 
does not declare the probative force of any evi-
dence, but declares the aim and end of the in-
vestigation shall be "ascertain the substantial 
rights of the parties and to carry out justly the 
spirit of the title." Ogden Iron Works v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 102 Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376 
(1942). 
In a proceeding to determine disability, the 
commission properly received into evidence the 
reports of a physician although they were hear-
say. Hackford v. Industrial Comm'n, 11 Utah 
2d 312. 358 P.2d 899 (1961). 
Hearsay admissions are not prejudicial 
where the facts abstracted by the Industrial 
Commission did not compel a reversal on the 
ground that the commission was arbitrary and 
capncious in entering its order. Williams v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 169,406 P.2d 707 
(1965). 
Appearance. 
By responding to notice sent out by commis-
sion and stipulating certain facts relating to 
employer, employers counsel and process 
agent in effect entered general appearance al-
though they stated they were appearing spe-
cially to object to commission's assumption of 
jurisdiction. Buckingham Transp. Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 93 Utah 342, 72 P.2d 1077 
(1937). 
Burden of proof. 
The burden of proof is on applicant to estab-
lish before the Industrial Commission that the 
injury resulted from the employee's employ-
ment, and this must be done by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. Grasteit v. Industrial 
Commn, 76 Utah 487, 290 P. 764 (1930); 
Whemtt v. Industrial Comm'n, 100 Utah 68, 
110 P.2d 374 (1941): General Mills, Inc. v. In-
dustrial Comm'n. 101 Utah 214, 120 P.2d 279 
(1941). 
Where plaintiff filed written objections to 
the report of the medical panel and objected to 
the report at the hearing, the burden was on 
the commission or the employer to sustain it 
and, where this was not done, the report could 
not be considered as evidence. Hackford v. In-
dustrial Commn. 11 Utah 312, 358 P.2d 899 
(1961). 
The burden of proof is on plaintiff to prove 
the extent of his disability; where plaintiff in-
troduces evidence that he is unemployable and 
a medical panel rates his medical disability at 
50%, it is within the discretion of the commis-
sion to find a 509e disability. Shipley v. C & W 
Contracting Co.. 528 P.2d 153 (Utah 1974). 
The burden of proof in workmen's compensa-
tion cases is proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Lipman v. Industrial Comm'n, 592 
P.2d 616 (Utah 1979). 
Conduct of proceedings before commis-
sion. 
Proceedings before Industrial Commission 
are very informal and in some respects "sui 
generis.'* Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
59 Utah 46, 201 P. 1034 (1921). 
Except for the application or petition of the 
applicant, pleadings are not necessary and 
generally are not filed. The hearings are infor-
mal in manner, time, and place. There is no 
attempt to observe the forms of rules which 
govern judicial trials, and the strict and formal 
rules of judicial procedure are as inapplicable 
to the form and manner of making objections 
and defenses as they are to the presentation 
and proof of claims for compensation. The main 
reason back of ail of this was to enable lay 
members of society, if necessary, to prosecute 
proceedings under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act. with the assistance, if necessary, of 
the Industrial Commission. Taslich v. Indus-
trial Comm'n. 71 Utah 33, 262 P. 281 (1927). 
The same procedure is specified in all cases, 
irrespective of who or what the employer may 
be and whether compensation is assured by an 
insurance company, the state insurance fund, 
or the employer as a self-insurer. No difference 
can be made between the different kinds of em-
ployers and insurance carriers, but all must be 
treated alike. Woldberg v. Industrial Comm'n, 
74 Utah 309. 279 P. 609 (1929). 
A broad discretion is vested in Industrial 
Commission by this section with respect to 
manner in which its investigations shall be 
conducted, and unless it is shown that some 
substantial right of a party has been denied 
him. or that he has been deprived of an oppor-
tunity to fairly and fully develop his case. Su-
preme Court will not interfere to direct method 
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of conducting such heanngs. Spencer v Indus-
trial Comm n, 81 Utah 511, 20 P.2d 618 (1933). 
Where there is a conflict in the testimony, 
and the weight and credibility to be given tes-
timony of the various witnesses is the deter-
mining factor, in order to accord a "full hear-
ing' to which ail litigants are entitled, the per-
son who conducts the hearing, hears the testi-
mony, ana sees the witnesses while testifying, 
whether a member of the board of an examiner 
3r referee, must either participate in the deci-
sion or where, at the time the decision is ren-
dered, he has severed his connections with the 
Doard, commission or fact-finding body, the 
-ecord must show affirmatively that the one 
who finds the facts had access to the benefit of 
us findings, conclusions and impressions of 
>uch testimony by either written or oral re-
ports thereof. This does not necessarily require 
ill of the commissioners to be present at the 
leanng, or even that the one hearing the evi-
lence must concur in the result, but his opin-
on on the testimony must be available to the 
:ommission in making its decision. Crow v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 104 Utah 333, 140 P.2d 321, 
148 A.L.R. 316 (1943); E.C. Olsen Co. v. State 
Tax Commn, 109 Utah 563, 168 P.2d 324 
1946). 
Constitutional rights of parties. 
While the Industrial Commission is given 
Dower to adopt its own rules of procedure 
§ 35-1-10), and is not bound by the usual com-
non-law or statutory rules of evidence or by 
my technical or formal rules of procedure, 
iiles promulgated by the commission must not 
lepnve parties of constitutional rights to day 
n court and of having cause determined after 
mpartial hearing. Ocean Accident & Guaran-
ee Corp. v Industrial Commn, 66 Utah 600, 
45 P. 343 (1926) 
Industrial Commission, in exercising its 
ights to proceed without certain formalities 
nder this section, must not deprive any party 
f every fair means of eliciting facts to be 
nally determined nor unnecessarily limit 
-oss-examination of witnesses. Ocean Acci-
?nt & Guarantee Corp. v. Industnal Commn, 
5 Utah 600, 245 P. 343 (1926). 
An award of compensation, supported by 
ibstantial competent evidence, will not be re-
»rsed on the ground that appellant was de-
ed a fair and impartial heanng where it does 
»t appear witnesses were in any way hindered 
influenced by the hearing examiner, and it 
es not appear that said witnesses were not 
ven opportunity to, or did not freely give 
eir opinions respecting the matter about 
uch they were interrogated. Ocean Accident 
Guarantee Corp. v Industrial Commn, 66 
ah 600, 245 P. 343 (1926). 
legation of power to take testimony. 
ndustnal Commission has authority to dele-
gate to deputy, designated as referee, the 
power to take testimony in support of or 
against the application of anyone asking relief 
before commission: and the power to take testi-
mony necessarily carries with it the authority 
to administer oaths. Utah Copper Co. v. Indus-
tnal Comm'n, 57 Utah 118, 193 P. 24, 13 
A.L.R. 1367 (1920). 
General construction. 
Provisions of this section conferring upon In-
dustnal Commission wide discretion in ascer-
taining substantial nghts of parties should be 
construed in conjunction with § 35-1-78 in de-
termining powers of commission under provi-
sion confexnng upon it continuing junsdiction 
in compensation cases. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Industnal Comm'n, 69 Utah 102, 252 P. 567 
(1926). 
The commisssion is not bound by the rules of 
evidence recognized by the common law. 
Ogden Iron Works v. Industnal Comm'n, 102 
Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376 (1942). 
Hearsay. 
Hearsay rule has no application m a commis-
sion proceeding and the commission and its 
hearing officers may receive and consider any 
hearsay evidence presented to it. Schmidt v. 
Industnal Commn, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980). 
The hearsay rule does not apply in adminis-
trative heanngs. Bunnell v. Industnal 
Comm'n, 740 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1987). 
Judicial notice. 
Rule that court may take judicial notice of 
proceedings and records in the cause before it, 
but cannot in one case take judicial notice of its 
own records in another and different case, ap-
plies to Industnal Commission. Spencer v. In-
dustnal Commn, 81 Utah 511, 20 P.2d 618 
(1933). 
Neither Utah Industnal Commission nor Su-
preme Court of this state can take judicial no-
tice of workmen's compensation laws of an-
other state. If not offered in evidence, presump-
tion is that they are the same as those of the 
forum. United Air Lines Transp. Corp. v. In-
dustnal Comm'n, 107 Utah 52, 151 P.2d 591 
(1944). 
Jury trial* 
Industnal Commission is not a court, court 
procedure is not applicable to proceedings be-
fore it, and it has no power to grant demand for 
jury tnal to try issue of fact. Palle v. Industnal 
Comm'n, 81 Utah 372, 18 P.2d 299 (1933). 
Raising and waiving objections. 
Employer and insurer could not complain of 
introduction into evidence of report made a 
year earlier by their own doctor as to claim-
ant's condition the day following the closing of 
the hearing, as they had knowledge of its con-
tents and could not have been taken by sur-
263 
40-1-&8 LABOR - INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
prise. Tintic Std. Mining Co. v. Industrial 
Commn, 100 Utah 96, 110 P.2d 367 (1941). 
Rehearing. 
Notice of hearing on petition for rehearing is 
not required where, after rehearing is granted, 
applicant is given notice of second hearing and, 
hence, ail his rights are fully protected. Pinyon 
Queen Mining Co. v. Industrial Commn, 59 
Utah 402. 204 P. 323 (1922). 
Stipulations. 
In compensation cases stipulations as to ju-
risdictional facts are to be encouraged because 
they shorten the proceedings and take from ap-
plicants burden of proving matters about 
which ordinarily there should be no dispute. 
General Mills, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 99 
Utah 293, 105 P.2d 340 (1940). 
Stipulation that employee received accident 
arising out of or in course of employment 
would be considered withdrawn or negated, 
where investigation showed that date of acci-
dent had been erroneously stated. General 
Mills, Inc. v. Industrial Commn, 99 Utah 293, 
105 P.2d 340 (1940). 
Question whether defendant employer has 
stipulated certain facts as true depends upon 
terms of stipulation. Smith v. Industrial 
Commn, 104 Utah 318, 140 P.2d 314 (1943). 
Stipulation to take testimony. 
Attorney for applicant was not required to 
make statement to Industrial Commission of 
what he proposed to prove by witness where he 
relied upon stipulation to take further testi-
mony. McVicar v. Industrial Comm'n, 56 Utah 
342, 191 P. 1089 (1920). 
Taking testimony. 
When an award of compensation has been 
annulled and the commission again considers 
the question of whether or not compensation 
should be allowed, the commission may, by 
reason of the provisions of this section, con-
sider evidence received at the hearing or hear-
ings had before the award was annulled. 
Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Industrial Commn, 
74 Utah 316, 279 P. 612 (1929). 
This section was not intended to authorize 
the commission in receiving and considering 
evidence to disregard the common-law or stat-
utory rules of evidence and adopt those of 
Latin countries. Diaz v. Industrial Commn, 80 
Utah 77, 13 P.2d 307 (1932). 
Commission may not, without cause or rea-
son, disregard or refuse to give effect to uncon-
tradicted evidence, nor may commission, 
whether it makes findings of fact or not, arbi-
trarily or capriciously refuse to believe and to 
act upon credible evidence which is 
unquestioned and undisputed. Spencer v. In-
dustrial Commn, 87 Utah 336, 40 P.2d 188, 
afTd 87 Utah 358, 48 P.2d 1120 (1935). 
The purpose of this section in relaxing the 
rules of evidence ordinarily obtaining in the 
trial of cases was to throw as much light as 
possible upon the general situation in an in-
dustrial case. Columbia Steel Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 92 Utah 72, 66 P.2d 124 (1937). 
Commission should not receive evidence on 
disputed matters where a hearing is held after 
the hearing is closed. Tintic Std. Mining Co. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 100 Utah 96, 110 P.2d 367 
(1941). 
Taking testimony—admissibility and com-
petency of evidence. 
Physician's testimony regarding statement 
made to him by claimant's wife concerning 
claimant's health prior to alleged injury was 
admissible before board despite its hearsay na-
ture. Pruce v. Fruehauf Corp., 27 Utah 2d 370, 
496 P.2d 712 (1972). 
Weight and sufficiency of evidence. 
Industrial Commission is not authorized to 
make rules prescribing what evidence is neces-
sary to warrant recovery in hernia cases since 
such involves substantive law which Legisla-
ture delegated no power to commission. Living-
ston v. Industrial Commn, 68 Utah 567,251 P. 
368 (1926). 
The preponderance of evidence rule applies 
in proceedings to establish claims before the 
Industrial Commission. Grasteit v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 76 Utah 487, 290 P. 764 (1930). 
Industrial Commission is not required to be-
lieve uncontradicted evidence unless there is 
nothing in the record which is intrinsically dis-
crediting to such testimony. Gerber v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 91 Utah 479, 64 P.2d 1281 
(1937). 
Industrial Commission cannot compel cer-
tain sorts of evidence, but must take cases as 
they are presented with such evidence as na-
ture of case permits, and from such evidence 
come to its conclusion, rather than from fact 
that certain type of evidence, presentation of 
which it makes a condition precedent, has not 
been forthcoming. Milkovich v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 91 Utah 498, 64 P.2d 1290 (1937). 
There must be a residuum of evidence, legal 
and competent in a court of law, to support a 
claim before an award can be made; and a find-
ing cannot be based wholly upon hearsay evi-
dence. Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 102 Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376 (1942). 
This section means that the commission may 
act upon hearsay evidence where the circum-
stances are such that the evidence offered is 
deemed by the commission to be trustworthy. 
Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial Comm'n, 102 
Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376 (1942). 
Industrial Commission is entitled to disbe-
lieve the testimony of an interested witness. 
Godfrey v. Industrial Comm'n, 105 Utah 324, 
142 P.2d 174 (1943). 
The commission is not bound to accept the 
264 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-90 
testimony of plaintiff as to the cause of his eye 
injury to the exclusion of all other testimony 
and record evidence. Lorange v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 107 Utah 261, 153 P.2d 272 (1944). 
Although the commission may receive and 
consider any kind of evidence that may throw 
light on a pending claim, there must be a 
residuum of evidence, legal and competent in a 
court of law, to support an award, and a finding 
cannot be based wholly upon hearsay evidence. 
Hackford v. Industrial Comm'n, 11 Utah 2d 
312, 358 P.2d 899 (1961). 
The commission must look at all relevant ev-
idence in reaching its findings without being 
C.J.S. — 100 C J.S. Workmen's Compensa-
tion § 525. 
A.L.R. — Workmen's compensation: use of 
medical books or treatises as independent evi-
dence, 17 A.L.R.3d 993. 
restricted to giving evidence from specific wit-
nesses more weight than that from other wit-
nesses. Rushton v. Gelco Express & Employers 
Mut Liab., 732 P.2d 109 (Utah 1986). 
The administrative law judge was not re-
quired as a matter of law to accept the findings 
of plaintiffs treating physician and reject those 
of the medical panel. Rushton v. Gelco Express 
& Employers Mut. Liab., 732 P.2d 109 (Utah 
1986). 
Cited in Ring v. Industrial Comm'n, 744 
P.2d 602 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Hearsay evidence in proceedings before state 
administrative agencies, 36 A.L.R.3d 12. 
Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
«= 1165. 
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Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 86001152 
MICHAEL BLACKETT, * 
* 
Applicant, * 
vs. * 
RALPH H. LARSEN & SONS, INC. and/or* 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND * 
OF UTAH, * 
Defendants. * 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The parties hereto stipulated that the case could be referred 
directly to the medical panel, since there were only medical issues 
involved. The medical panel report was received by the Commission 
and copies were forwarded to the parties. Thereafter, a report 
from the psychiatric member of the panel, Dr. Burgoyne, was also 
forwarded to the parties as a supplemental panel report. In 
response thereto, applicant, by and through counsel, made a Motion 
to Amend Application for Hearing to allege that the applicant was 
suffering from compensation neurosis, based on applicant's reading 
of the findings of Dr. Burgoyne. However, in reviewing the report 
of Dr. Burgoyne, and the rest of the medical evidence contained on 
this file, I find that the applicant has mischaracterized Dr. 
Burgoyne's report. The applicant feels that Dr. Burgoyne indicates 
that the applicant clearly suffers from a somatoform pain disorder 
and that this is a result of the industrial accident. However, 
careful scrutiny of Dr. Burgoyne's findings indicates that the 
applicant "could be suffering from a somatoform disorder." 
(Emphasis added). Dr. Burgoyne goes on to indicate that "There was 
a possibility that this diagnosis would be related to the May 1, 
1990 injury." (Emphasis added). As so aptly noted by the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah, the foregoing language of Dr. Burgoyne 
does not satisfy the evidentiary requirements in these matters. In 
these cases, medical evidence must be stated in terms of reasonable 
medical probability. It is for this reason that the medical panel 
in its charge is always instructed by the Industrial Commission to 
couch its findings in terms of "reasonable medical probability". 
I find that the better view of Dr. Burgoyne7s conclusions is that 
any somatoform pain disorder that the applicant might have would be 
related to his previous psychological makeup, since Dr. Burgoyne 
found that there was no organic pathology, and that the applicant's 
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complaint of pain or impairment was in excess of what would be 
expected from his physical findings. However, that observation by 
Dr. Burgoyne is not clear proof of compensation neurosis as alleged 
by the applicant. Rather, other than the applicant's 
mischaracterization of Dr. Burgoyne's findings, there is no medical 
evidence whatsoever to support the applicant's contention that he 
suffers compensation neurosis as the result of the industrial 
accident. Accordingly, I find that the applicant's attempt to 
amend his Application to allege a compensation neurosis should be, 
and the same is hereby dismissed. 
I find that the medical panel report is a very thorough and 
thoughtful analysis of the medical issues and opinions contained on 
this file. Having reviewed the medical evidence on the file, I 
find that the medical panel's analysis of that evidence is balanced 
and well reasoned, and accordingly, the medical panel report is 
admitted into evidence and the findings therein are adopted by the 
Administrative Law Judge as his own. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant herein, Michael Blackett, sustained a 
compensable industrial accident on May 1, 1990, while employed by 
Ralph H. Larsen & Sons. The applicant was working as a truck 
driver, and was in the Kanab, Utah, area when he had some problems 
with the radiator of his truck. He stayed overnight and the 
following morning was standing on the frame of the truck, when he 
touched the radiator, which was quite hot, with his hand. Of 
course, his hand instinctively retracted and his wrist struck a 
part of the truck. The applicant had this happen a second time, 
and, on that occasion, he stepped backward and fell onto the fine 
gravel surface striking his back, shoulder and head. The medical 
records contained on the file clearly indicate that the applicant 
was not knocked unconscious. The applicant did not make a big deal 
out of his fall, and on his way back to Salt Lake City, noted a 
swelling in his right arm. The applicant reported to the Holy 
Cross Emergency Room. 
At the emergency room, the applicant was seen for a contusion 
of the right forearm resulting from his industrial accident. There 
was no mention whatsoever of any injury to any other part of the 
applicant's body including his head. Over the next two weeks, the 
applicant continued to have complaints in his right arm and was 
sent to physical therapy. The applicant was complaining of pain 
from the wrist up to the upper arm and shoulder and pain into the 
neck. The applicant denied any neurological loss and none was 
noted. The applicant received follow-up treatment, and was 
referred to a physiatrist, Dr. Griffin, for physical medicine 
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treatment. An EMG performed on June 1, 1990, of the applicant's 
right upper extremity was normal. 
Dr. Griffin saw the applicant on June 6, 1990, and at that 
time made a diagnosis of a possible C6 radiculopathy and possible 
reflex sympathetic dystrophy. A bone scan failed to confirm the 
diagnosis of reflex sympathetic dystrophy and a CT scan if the 
applicant's neck was normal. By the end of June, 1990, the 
applicant was found to have decreased sensitivity of the entire 
right upper extremity, and was thought to have myofascial type pain 
in the trapezius. The first mention of any complaints of headaches 
by the applicant was noted on July 11, 1990, when the applicant 
complained that the headaches were also associated with dizziness. 
The applicant had an episode at home whereby he fell down and had 
a loss of urine. Because of these headaches, the applicant was 
referred to a neurologist, Dr. David Smith. 
Dr. Smith saw the applicant on July 16, 1990, and his history 
indicated that the applicant did not have a loss of consciousness 
as the result of the industrial injury of May 1, 1990. Dr. Smith 
also stated that the applicant did not have headaches until the end 
of July. Dr. Smith diagnosed a possible complex partial seizure 
disorder and recommended that the applicant receive an EEG and an 
MRI. The EEG was negative, while the MRI showed some focal white 
matter disease, which was felt to be of no clinical significance. 
Dr. Smith felt that the applicant had complex partial seizures and 
started the applicant on Dilantin. Dr. Smith recommended that the 
applicant receive a psychological assessment. Dr. Smith provided 
no treatment to the applicant beyond September 1990. 
On October 3, 1990, the applicant returned to the Holy Cross 
Emergency Room complaining of falling asleep, dizziness, and 
inability to function. At that time, the applicant was on Prozac, 
and it was opined that he was lethargic, and dizzy and possibly had 
a psychological component. The applicant received various 
evaluations from numerous health care providers. 
The applicant denied headaches before May 1, 1990. However, 
the applicant was seen on December 30, 1987, by Dr. Moress upon the 
referral of a chiropractor, Dr. Richard Wright. The applicant had 
fallen on December 24, 1987, while carrying a microwave oven. As 
a result, the applicant struck his left hip and shoulder and also 
began having severe neck pain, as well occipital temporal 
headaches. The applicant described those headaches as a 5-6/10 
intensity. Dr. Moress concluded that the headaches were related to 
his cervical ligamentous strain problem compounded by some cervical 
arthritis. These headaches of 1987, lasted approximately 3-4 
months. 
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On November 2, 1985, the applicant sustained an industrial 
accident to his low back. He received back surgery from Dr. 
Zahniser at the St. Marks Hospital. The applicant had a difficult 
recovery, and was out of work for four years. The applicant was 
followed extensively by Dr. Stadler of the Western Rehabilitation 
Institute. Dr. Stadler on July 15, 1988, diagnosed the applicants 
condition as a failed back syndrome associated with social 
problems. On August 4, 1988, Dr. Stadler found that the applicant 
had an inconsistent examination with symptom magnification. Dr. 
Lighty performed a psychological evaluation on the applicant and 
concluded that the applicant had a lack of confidence in ability to 
manage pain, significant affective distress with depression and 
anxiety, psychosocial stressors, minimizing somatizing coping style 
and deconditioning. The applicant was eventually given a 2 0% 
permanent partial impairment rating, with 10% being due to the 
industrial accident and 10% being due to pre-existing problems. 
The medical panel found that there was no post concussion 
syndrome/organic brain syndrome due to the industrial accident of 
May 1, 1990. The panel noted that there was no evidence whatsoever 
that the applicant had any loss of consciousness. In addition, 
there was no mention in the original emergency room notes of any 
problem with the applicant's head, and further, the applicant 
himself admitted to several physicians that there was no loss of 
consciousness. Of particular importance, is the fact that the 
applicant had no headaches develop until, according to the 
applicant, a month after the incident, and according to the medical 
records, not until July of 1990. The medical panel concluded that 
the headache mechanism was related to the cervical muscle strain in 
tension, and that the applicant's blackouts are a syncopal-like 
episode, or that they are some type of dissociative psychological 
reaction. The medical panel concluded that the applicant did not 
have "Any primary cerebral electrical event such as a seizure.11 
Rather, the panel concluded that the applicant has "An organic 
brain syndrome from his psychological evaluation. ..." The panel 
concluded that there was no causal relationship between the "Non-
existent head injury and the onset of an organic brain syndrome. An 
organic brain syndrome would be related to factors other than his 
5-1-90 industrial incident." The panel also noted that careful 
scrutiny should be made of the applicant's pre-morbid problems, 
"Including the 1985 back injury and the very prolonged recovery 
with much psychological overlay in his recovery." 
The medical panel found, in terms of reasonable medical 
probability, that the applicant's headaches were related to his 
cervical musculoligamentous strain and tension. The panel also 
found that there were episodic alterations of consciousness that 
were not related to seizures or any other identifiable organic 
source. The panel also found that the applicant was status post 
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L5-S1 laminectomy, discectomy, and finally, that the applicant had 
an organic brain syndrome, the etiology of which was unclear, but 
the panel concluded that it possibly was neurodegenerative. The 
panel concluded that the foregoing diagnosis were not a result of 
the industrial accident of May 1, 1990. The panel found, in 
addition, that the applicant's condition stabilized from the 
industrial accident one month following the accident or June 1, 
1990. 
As indicated previously, the Administrative Law Judge adopts 
the findings of the medical panel as his own. 
The defendants in this matter have paid the applicant 
temporary total disability at the rate of $222.00 per week for the 
period May 2, 1990 through October 19, 1990, for a total of 
$7,216.90. Pursuant to the medical panel findings, the applicant 
is entitled to one month of temporary total disability or 4.3 3 
weeks at the rate of $222.00 per week for a total award of $961.26. 
Since the applicant has been paid $7,216.90, the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah has overpaid the applicant $6,255.64. 
The medical panel also found that there was no permanent 
impairment due to the industrial accident of May 1, 1990. 
Accordingly, since there is no permanent impairment due to the 
industrial accident, by necessity, the applicant's claim for 
permanent total disability must also fall. Finally, there was a 
dispute concerning the amount of medical care received by the 
applicant. The medical panel found that medical treatment related 
to the industrial accident should end on September 11, 1990, when 
the applicant was last seen by Dr. Smith. Accordingly, the 
applicant is entitled to all medical expenses incurred for the 
period May 1, 1990 through September 11, 1990. Any expenses 
incurred after September 11, 1990, are the responsibility of the 
applicant. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of Michael Blackett 
alleging permanent total disability, permanent partial impairment, 
and additional temporary total disability as the result of his 
industrial accident of May 1, 1990, while employed by Ralph H. 
Larsen & Sons, Inc., should be, and the same is hereby dismissed 
with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ralph H. Larsen & Sons, Inc., 
and/or Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, shall pay all medical 
expenses incurred by the applicant on or before September 11, 1990, 
as the result of the industrial accident of May 1, 1990. Said 
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expenses to be paid in accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee 
Schedule of the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
Certified by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
.day of January, 1992. 
ATTEST: 
C*£ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on January ?Y , 1992, a copy of the 
attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in the 
case of Michael Blackett, was mailed to the following persons at 
the following addresses, postage paid: 
Michael Blackett, 2837 Breeze Drive, Magna, UT 84044 
Robert Breeze, Atty., 211 East 300 South, #215, SLC, UT 84111 
Deborah Larsen, Atty., Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By ?/{^Jf faJL^?^ 
Wilma Burrows 
A^T/'Adjudication Division 
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Appendix Number 6 
Medical Panel Report of August 21, 
1991 with Concurrence of Dr. 
Burgoyne dated September 16, 1991. 
(R. 55-69) 
Gerald R. Moress M.D., RC. 
NEUROLOGY 3 7 0 E- S o u t h T e m P , e ' S u i t e 3 0 0 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Teleohor.e (801) 363-7386 
August 2 1 , 1991 
Judge Timothy Allen 
State of Utah 
Adjudication Division 
P. 0. Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84141-0250 
Re: Michael Blackett 
Inj: 5-1-90 
Emp: Ralph H. Larsen & Sons, Inc. 
Dear Judge Allen: 
A panel composed of Gerald R. Moress, M.D. neurologist, 
chairman and Robert Burgoyne, M.D. psychiatrist, panel 
chairman, considered the medical matters of Mr. Blackett. 
His medical records were available for review. 
HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL INJURY: 
5-1-90 Mr. Blackett was working for Ralph H. Larsen & Sons as 
a truck driver. He was in Kanab and had had some problems 
with the radiator of his truck. He had stayed overnight and 
the next morning he was standing on the frame of the truck and 
touched the radiator with his hand which was quite hot. His 
hand reflexively retracted and his wrist struck something. 
This happened a second time and on the second occasion he 
stepped backward and fell onto the fine gravel surface, 
striking his back, shoulder, and his head. He does not feel 
that he was knocked unconscious, and if that did occur it 
would be no longer than a brief second. He said that he did 
not make a big deal out of his fall. On his way back to Salt 
Lake he noted a swelling of his right arm and went to the Holy 
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Cross Emergency Room. 
The date of service at Holy Cross Emergency Room was 5-1-90 
where he was seen for contusion of the right forearm that had 
occurred with the truck incident. There was no mention of any 
injury to any other part of his body including the head. The 
doctor did not ask him any question about the loss of 
consciousness or head injury. The diagnosis was contusion of 
the right forearm. Over the ensuing two weeks he continued 
to have complaints in the right arm and was sent to physical 
therapy. The complaints were from the wrist up to the upper 
arm and shoulder and now pain into the neck. He denied any 
neurological loss. On 5-15-90 the follow up Emergency Room 
visit still found right arm pain with a possible radicular 
component. He was referred to physiatrist Ben Griffin. I 
asked Mr. Blackett if he specifically had any headaches 
initially and he said he did not have any. He said the 
headaches began about a month after the injury when he was in 
therapy and they thought at first it was due to tight muscles 
or something in his jaw. 
An EMG performed 6-1-90 of the right upper extremity was 
normal. 
Dr. Griffin saw him on 6-6-90 with a diagnosis of possible C6 
radiculopathy and possible reflex sympathetic dystrophy (RSD) . 
A bone scan did not confirm the diagnosis of RSD and the CT 
scan of the neck was normal. By the end of June he was found 
to have decreased sensitivity of the entire right upper 
extremity, and he was thought to have myofascial type pain in 
the trapezius and temporalis muscle with trigger points. It 
was not until the 7-11-90 visit that specific headaches were 
mentioned associated with dizziness. He had an episode at 
home when he fell down with loss of urine. Because of the 
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headaches and the passing out spell he was referred to 
neurologist David Smith. 
Dr. Smith's evaluation was 7-16-90. His history included the 
statement that Mr. Blackett did not have a loss of 
consciousness with his 5-1-90 industrial incident. He also 
mentioned that it was not until the end of July that he 
developed the headaches. In addition, the episode of passing 
out that had recently occurred was mentioned. Dr. Smith 
diagnosed a possible complex partial seizure disorder and 
recommend an EEG and MRI. The EEG showed no epileptiform 
activity and the MRI showed some focal white matter disease 
that was felt not to be of any clinical significance. Dr. 
Smith felt because of a left temporal rare sharp wave that the 
patient had complex partial seizures and was started on an 
anticonvulsant. He continued to fall despite being on 
Dilantin and in August Dr. Smith now diagnosed a post 
concussive syndrome with possible seizures and mentioned that 
psychological evaluation might help. Dr. Smith gave a series 
of trigger point injections which Mr. Blackett said made him 
worse. Some family problems were mentioned by Dr. Smith and 
again re-emphasized the need for psychological assessment. 
He was not seen by Dr. Smith beyond September 1990. 
Mr. Blackett returned to the Holy Cross Emergency Room on 10-
3-90 because of falling asleep, dizzy, cannot function. He 
was on Prozac and it was felt that he was lethargic and dizzy 
and possibly had a psychological component. 
On four separate visits in September through November of 1990 
Mr. Blackett was evaluated by psychologist Dr. Gregory Mayer 
at the request of the Fund. It was Dr. Mayer's assessment 
that Mr. Blackett had cognitive deficits not consistent with 
his past educational and occupational histories. He had 
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problems in attention/concentration. Psychomotor slowing was 
noted. A factitious disorder was considered but felt to be 
unlikely. Anxiety and depression were mentioned as a possible 
source for some of his complaints. He was felt to have neural 
behavioral problems consistent with an organic brain 
dysfunction. He was found to have a full scale IQ of 92, 
verbal of 89 and a performance of 99. 
Neurologist Nat Nord saw Mr. Blackett on 10-17-90 for the 
Fund. He was complaining of occipital and cervical pains, 
right trapezius pain, headaches, ear pressure, light-
headedness and vertigo, as well as black outs which had 
occurred on several occasions with one lasting 30-40 minutes. 
Dr. Nord repeated an electroencephalogram that showed no 
epileptiform activity. Dr. Nord did not feel that the patient 
had a seizure disorder. He felt that there was a tenuous 
causal relationship between his headaches and his industrial 
incident. He felt that many of the complaints were functional 
in nature and that he was stable. He gave him a 30 day TTD 
as a result of his industrial accident. Dr. Nord did not feel 
that there was a closed head injury, post traumatic 
encephalopathy, nor was there any evidence of vestibular 
abnormality on testing done at Holy Cross to detect such a 
problem. 
Psychiatrist Dave McCann performed an evaluation for the Fund 
on 4-30-91 and based on the interview and information 
available to him, he diagnosed an organic mental disorder 
based on the findings of Dr. Mayer and whether the dysfunction 
was caused by a closed head injury was in question. He felt 
the psychological diagnosis was related to the industrial 
injury of May 1990. He did not feel he had a post-traumatic 
stress disorder. He felt he was temporally and totally 
disabled. He did not want to give him an impairment rating 
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at that time. 
Mr. Blackett was seen for rehabilitation group Heal and 
Company by Dr. Matsuo, a neurologist at the University Medical 
Center 12-26-90. Dr. Matsuo mentioned a possible post-
traumatic stress disorder. He did not feel he had a seizure 
disorder. He mentioned pre-existing symptoms of motion 
sickness and labyrinthitis in 1982, erratic sleep habits were 
mentioned since 1959. In another note dictated 2 weeks later 
to Heal and Company Dr. Matsuo mentioned that he could not 
identify evidence of permanent central nervous system damage 
resulting from his 5-1-90 accident. He felt the episodes of 
loss of consciousness were some type of syncopal episode and 
not epileptic. 
At the request of his family physician, Taylor Jeppsen, he 
was seen for another neurological consultation on his own 
6-11-91 by neurologist, Tom Houts. Dr. Houts felt that the 
patient had physiologic headaches, most probably tension but 
possibly occasional migraine. The syncopal episodes he felt 
were related to his headaches or stress. He found no evidence 
of any neurological illness or organic brain syndrome. He did 
not feel he had evidence of brain injury from his head trauma 
and placed him on Calan. He also had the history that there 
had been no loss of consciousness at the time of the accident 
5-1-90. An EEG was normal. 
Physiatric consultation was obtained from Dr. Mark McGlothlin 
for Heal and Company 10-11-90. The doctor's impressions were 
closed head injury secondary to a 5-1-90 fall plus probable 
seizure disorder, problems of cognition, emotional, behavioral 
problems, as well as cervical musculoligamentous strain, right 
upper extremity injury, details unknown. 
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PRIOR HEADACHE COMPLAINTS 
The patient said he had never had headaches before this 
accident. I then mentioned to Mr. Blackett that I had seen 
him 12-30-87 for chiropractor Richard Wright for severe post-
traumatic cervical muscle spasm and headaches. He had fallen 
on 12-24-87 while carrying a microwave oven. He struck his 
left hip and shoulder and then began having severe neck pain 
as well as occipital temporal headaches. His headaches were 
described as a 5-6/10 intensity. It is my feeling that the 
headaches were related to his cervical ligamentous strain 
problem compounded by some cervical arthritis. CT scan of the 
cervical spine was normal. Mr. Blackett told me that he had 
forgotten all about those severe headaches. He said they 
lasted about 3-4 months. 
CURRENT COMPLAINTS: 
He has headaches that begin at the base of the head which 
began one month after the accident. They radiate into the 
occipital region and behind his eyes. They are anywhere 
between a 7-9/10 and have been continuous since May of 1990. 
They are associated with dry heaves. His scalp feels prickly. 
BLACK-OUTS 
He last had a black-out July 1, 1991 when he was found by his 
son sitting in front of the television with his eyes open and 
staring. He is not sure how long the episode lasted. When 
it was over he felt as though he had been asleep. He has no 
warning before he goes into these episodes. They may occur 
sitting or standing, they have never occurred in the recumbent 
position. He describes these black-outs having occurred in 
July of 1990 and then January of 1991 and the last episode 
described. He also has feelings of intermittent vertigo and 
dizziness. These are not always clearly related to changes 
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in posture. 
DEPRESSION 
He admits to some degree of depression manifested by lack of 
caring and decreased motivation. His libido is good and his 
appetite is also good. 
PAST INDUSTRIAL INJURIES 
In 1985 he hurt his low back at work which resulted in 
extruded disc at L5-S1. Surgery was performed 11-13-85 by 
neurosurgeon Jack Zahniser at St. Marks Hospital. He did not 
do well following that surgery and in fact was out of work for 
four years. He was followed extensively by Dr. Stadler at the 
Western Rehabilitation Institute. On 7-15-88 Dr. Stadler 
mentioned a failed back syndrome associated with social 
problems which were affecting his back pain. On 8-4-88 Dr. 
Stadler mentioned an inconsistent examination with symptom 
magnification. Evaluation by psychologist, Larry Lighty was 
performed for Dr. Stadler and mentioned lack of confidence in 
ability to manage painf significant affective distress with 
depression and anxiety, psychosocial stressors, minimizing 
somatizing coping style, and deconditioning. Problems with 
depression were previously mentioned between 1978 and 1990. 
The last note from Dr. Stadler to the insurance carrier was 
dated 8-4-89 at which time he gave him a 10% impairment rating 
for his low back problem. Mr. Blackett was eventually given 
that rating from the industrial commission. 
EDUCATION: 
Mr. Blackett has worked in electronics previously. He did 
recently attempt to take an entry examination to get back into 
electronics and failed the examination. Things which he said 
had been easy for him previously in terms of working in that 
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field have now become difficult for him. 
He has had two years of junior college in general education. 
MEDICATIONS: 
Calan which he says has helped his headaches. 
HABITS: 
Alcohol minimal, tobacco none. 
MILITARY HISTORY: 
Four years with an honorable discharge 
EXAMINATION: 
An affable middle aged man who sat comfortably during the 
interview. When I brought out my old consultation on him he 
then remembered that he had seen me previously. 200 pounds, 
5f10,f, right handed. 
VITAL SIGNS: 
Blood pressure 140/90 sitting, recumbent, and standing. 
LUNGS: 
Clear 
HEART: 
No murmurs 
ABDOMEN: 
There was a well healed midline epigastric scar 
CRANIAL NERVES: 
II through XII revealed no abnormalities. 
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SHOULDERS: 
Full range of motion 
MOTOR: 
Reflexes 2+ and equal, no pathological reflexes, no evidence 
of weakness. 
SENSATION: 
Intact to pin prick throughout. 
CEREBELLAR: 
Finger to nose, rapid movements, heel to shin, tandem gait 
performed well. 
SPINE: 
Axial loading caused pain referred to the cervical region. 
CERVICAL: 
Full range of motion, diffusely tender over the cervical 
spines, right paracervical musculature. The muscles were 
supple. 
DORSAL: 
Full rotation, nontender 
LUMBOSACRAL: 
1+ tender over 3 cm. lumbosacral scar. The muscles were 
supple and he had full range of motion. 
STRAIGHT LEG RAISING: 
Negative to 70 degrees bilaterally 
ASSESSMENT: 
Mr. Blackett had a history of an industrial accident in 1985 
9 
and had a very poor response to surgery to remove an L5-S1 
disc. He was out of work for four years. Review of the 
records from the Western Rehabilitation Institute revealed 
that he had poor coping skills associated with depression, 
anxiety, and somatic preoccupation. There were no mention of 
headaches until my note in 1987 when he presented with severe 
headaches in relationship to a recent industrial fall. Mr. 
Blackett had originally told me that he had had no prior 
headaches before his fall in Kanab until I brought out the old 
records. He said he had totally forgotten about that episode. 
I find it incredulous that one would believe that Mr. Blackett 
has a post concussion syndrome/organic brain syndrome 
secondary to his May 1990 industrial incident. There is no 
evidence that he had any loss of consciousness whatsoever. 
There was no mention in the original emergency room notes of 
any problem with the head, and even Mr. Blackett admitted to 
several physicians that there was no loss of consciousness. 
In factf he had no headaches develop, according to him, until 
a month after the incident and according to the medical 
records not until July. The headache mechanism appears to be 
related to cervical muscle strain and tension in agreement to 
many observers who have seen him. His black-outs appear to 
be a syncopal-like episode or they are some type of 
dissociative psychological reaction. The bottom line is that 
they do not represent any primary cerebral electrical event 
such as a seizure. This would be in agreement with the IME 
of Dr. Nord and opinion of Dr. Matsuo. 
Since there appears to be documentation on the record of an 
organic brain syndrome from his psychological evaluation, I 
would accept that. What I would not accept would be an 
attempt to find a causal relationship between non-existent 
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head injury and the onset of an organic brain syndrome. An 
organic brain syndrome would be related to factors other than 
his 5-1-90 industrial incident. These factors have not been 
identified. 
Rather than looking at the 5-1-90 accident as an isolated 
event, I feel it has to be looked at in terms of his premorbid 
problems including the 1985 back injury and the very prolonged 
recovery with much psychological overlay in his recovery. 
In terms of reasonable medical probability, I find that his 
medical diagnoses are: 
Headaches chronic and recurring relating to cervical 
musculoligamentous strain and tension. 
Episodic alterations of consciousness not related to seizures 
or any other identifiable organic source. 
Status post L5-S1 laminectomy discectomy. 
Organic brain syndrome, etiology unclear, possibly 
neurodegenerative. 
The above diagnoses are not a result of the industrial 
accident of 5-1-90. 
His condition has stabilized. I would allow him one month to 
have recovered from the industrial accident of 5-1-90. The 
only injury that I could identify from that accident was that 
of his right upper extremity direct trauma. 
There was no permanent partial impairment due to the 
industrial accident of 5-1-90. 
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7. Since his problem became so complex following what appeared 
to be a relatively minor injury, I would allow the medical 
treatment that was subsequently provided to be related to the 
5-1-90 injury. I don't feel that the insurance carrier should 
have been liable for any additional treatment beyond 9-11-90 
when last seen by Dr. Smithf however. 
Sincerely, 
Gerald R. Moress/TT.D. P.C. 
GRM:dsm 
Tx: 8/22/91 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on July 15, 1991, a copy of the attached 
Medical Panel letter in the case of Michael Blackett was mailed to 
the following persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Robert Burgoyne, M.D. 
Michael Blackett 
2837 Breeze Dr. 
Magna, Utah 84044 
Robert Breeze, Esq. 
211 East 300 So., # 215 
SLC, Utah 84111 
Deborah Larsen, Esq. 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By . ^ ( ^ ^ 
Wilma Burrows 
VTte" 
Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
Timothy C. Allen 
Presiding Administrative Law Judge 
State of Utah 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
ADJUDICATION DIVISION 
160 East 300 South 
PO Box 510250 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84151-0250 
(801)530-6800 
(801) 530-6804 (Fax) 
September 16, 1991 
Stephen M. Hadley 
Chairman 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Dixie L. Minson 
Commissioner 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED 
Michael Blackett 
2837 Breeze Dr. 
Magna, Utah 84044 
Re: Michael Blackett 
Inj: 5-1-90 
Emp: Ralph H. Larsen 
Sons 
Dear Mr. Blackett: 
We are enclosing a copy of the signed report of the Medical 
Panel in connection with your claim. 
You are allowed fifteen (15) days from the date of this letter 
within which to file objections, if you are not satisfied with the 
findings of the panel. Please specify in detail the basis of your 
objections to each finding and conclusion. Further, state in 
detail the medical evidence or facts you rely on as a basis of your 
objection. Copies of objections must be mailed to all parties 
concerned. 
Parties who desire to submit the matter on written objections 
without a hearing may so indicate in a letter accompanying the 
objections. A hearing will not be set on the objections unless 
there is a proffer of conflicting medical testimony. If a hearing 
is scheduled, the Medical Panel Chairman will be requested by the 
Commission to appear and testify and all parties will be notified 
of the time and place of the hearing. 
When no objections to a Medical Panel Report are received, the 
Administrative Law Judge will decide the case on the record as 
currently constituted. 
BY DIRECTION; 
INDUSTRIAL-COMMISSION OF UTAH 
ti QM— 
TCA:wb 
cc:Robert Breeze, Atty., 
Deborah Larsen, Atty. 
TimothyIC. Allen 
Administrative Law Judge 
211 East 300 So., 
, WCFU 
SLC, UT 84111 
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\ ^ Salt Lake City, UJah 84J 43 
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September 16, 1991 
Honorable Timothy Allen 
State of Utah 
Adjudication Division 
P.O. Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84141-0250 
Re: Michael Blackett ,*- —,/ ^ --» 
inj: 5/1/90 ^0^^7/17 
Emp: Ralph H. Larsen & Sons, Inc. 
Dear Judge Allen: 
I have conferred with Gerald R. Moress, M.D., neurologist, and read 
his report concerning the above patient. I agree entirely with Dr. 
Moress's conclusions. My opinion is that there was no permanent 
partial impairment due to the industrial accident of May 1, 1990, 
as I indicated in the psychiatric evaluation, which Dr. Moress is 
enclosing with his report. The patient could be suffering from a 
somatoform pain disorder. This would indicate that an appropriate 
evaluation has uncovered no organic pathology or pathophysiologic 
mechanism and the complaint of pain or impairment is in excess of 
what would be expected from the physical findings. I indicated 
that there was a possibility that this diagnosis would be related 
to the May 1, 1990 injury. If so, the injury would not be a direct 
cause, but provide an avenue to develop the pain. The insurance 
courier should not be liable for this, because in my opinion this 
would be a result of the person's psychological make-up. 
If you need more information from me, please let me know. 
Yours respectfully, 
2/ 
H. Burgbyne,MiD .S 
P s y c h i a t r i s t ^ ' 
/mb 
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Tab 7 
Appendix Number 7 
Industrial Commission Rule R568-1-9 
Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel 
R568-1-9. Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel. 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the Commission adopts the followi 
guidelines in determining the necessity of submitting a case to a medical 
panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be involved. Generall> 
significant medical issue must be shown by conflicting medical reports. 
Significant medical issues are involved when there are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which 
vary more than 5% of the whole person, 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total cutoff date 
which vary more than 90 days, and/or 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to more than $2,000. 
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be scheduled if 
there is a proffer of conflicting medical testimony showing a need to clarif 
the medical panel report. Where there is a proffer of new written conflicti 
medical evidence, the Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a hearing, 
re-submit the new evidence to the panel for consideration and clarification. 
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an injured worker to b< 
examined by another physician for the purpose of obtaining a further medical 
examination or evaluation pertaining to the medical issues involved, and to 
obtain a report addressing these medical issues in all cases where: 
1. The treating physician has failed or refused to give an impairment 
rating, 
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be non-industrial, 
and/or 
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such further evaluation. 
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical panel or medical 
consultant and of their appearance at a hearing, as well as any expenses for 
further medical examination or evaluation, as directed by the Administrative 
Law Judge, shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
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Tab 8 
Appendix Number 8 
Motion for Review 
February 26, 1992 
(R. 84-85) 
ROBERT BREEZE #4278 
Attorney for Claimant 
211 East Broadway #215 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 322-2138 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OP UTAH 
MICHAEL BLACKETT, ) MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Applicant, ) 
vs. ) 
RALPH H. LARSEN & SONS, INC. ) Case No. 86001152 
and/or WORKERS COMPENSATION ) 
FUND OF UTAH, ) 
Defendants. ) Honorable Timothy C. Allen 
COMES NOW the Applicant herein who moves the Commission for an 
Order reversing the decision of the Administrative Law Judge on the 
foillowing grounds: 
1. The Administrative Law Judge failed to refer the matter 
of Compensation Neurosis back to the Medical Panel for a full 
analysis of whether the somatoform pain disorder was in fact caused 
by the industrial injury. 
WHEREFORE, Claimant prays for the following relief: 
1. For an Order remanding the matter back to the 
Administrative Law Judge with instructions to refer this case back 
to the Medical Panel for a full evaluation of the somatoform pain 
disorder and the issue of causation related to Temporary Total and 
084 
Permanent Partial Disability. 
DATED this day of February, 1992 
ROBERT BREEZE N-
Attorney for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify I mailed a copy of the foregoing to: 
Deborah Larsen 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
560 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
on this ^C? day of February, 1992. 
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